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This dissertation discusses the challenges to interorganizational collaboration in Integrated 
Coastal Management (ICM) projects in the developing world. A fier roughly 20 years of 
implementation, ICM is just beginning to systematically review its initiatives especially in the 
developing world. The early reviews of ICM initiatives that have been published note several 
challenges that are hindering the effectiveness of many ICM initiatives. One of these challenges is 
how to implement effective interorganizational coordination in ICM initiatives. The ICM literature, 
and consequently ICM initiatives, to date has not exhibited a very sophisticated understanding of how 
interorganizational relations function, and why they might fail. This dissertation seeks to provide to 
ICM implementers a more sophisticated understanding of interorganizational relations that has 
heretofore been lacking. It does this in several ways. First, this dissertation provides a review of the 
evolution of coastal management theory and practice from its inception to the present day with 
particular reference to how coastal managers in the developing world have handled the human 
dimension of coastal environments. Second, this dissertation reviews the work of several academics 
who have studied Interorganizational Relations (lOR). Most of these academics work in fields such 
as Economics, Administrative and Management Science, and even Sociology. None of the lOR 
literature deals specifically with coastal management issues and no ICM literature shows any 
recognition of lOR theory. Third, this dissertation, in order to investigate the relevancy of lOR 
theories and principles to interorganizational relations in ICM initiatives, undertook research on an 
ICM initiative in Southwestern Madagascar. The findings of this research suggest that lOR theories 
and principles are capable of giving useful explanations of, and insights about, the interorganizational 
relations that are occurring in ICM initiatives. Finally, this dissertation discusses lOR theory's 
insights in terms ofthe case study investigated and more generally in terms of what lOR theory states is 
important to fostering effective interorganizational coordination in ICM initiatives in the developing 
world. This dissertation concludes by suggesting that its own review of the lOR literature is by no 
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1.1 Background and rationale 
Integrated Coastal Management CICM) is now roughly a 20 year old discipline. Formed in 
response to the overly technocratic, centralized, and sectoral, coastal management systems found in the 
developed world in the 1950s and 60s, ICM has sought to innovate and improve coastal management 
practice by introducing several new ideas. These ideas emphasize the linkages and dependencies that 
exist between ecological, socio-economic and governance systems.(Cincin-Sain and Knecht, 1998, 
Brown et al., 2002) . From an ecological perspective, ICM requires that the coastal environment must 
be understood holistically. The coast cannot be separated from the rivers that flow into it, or even from 
the ports that are built on it (Griffis 1996). Furthermore, ICM insists that coastal environments are 
dynamic and complex systems and must be managed accordingly. The attempts by the older 
technocratic systems to maintain a prescribed optimal or "natural" state have been abandoned. ICM 
recognizes that ecological systems are in a constant state of flux and that attempting to maintain any 
time-specific set of characteristics as "natural" is artificial and ultimately an impossible and ecological 
unsustainable management objective. From a social science perspective, ICM insists that people 
living in the coastal zone are as much a part of coastal environments as sand and salt water and 
management efforts must be participatory and considerate of human needs (Francis & Torrel, 2004). 
From a governance perspective, lCM states that for both practical and ideological reasons related to the 
above sociological and ecological understandings, every entity involved in coastal management must 
coordinate, or "integrate," their plans, polices, and projects (Cicin-Sain et. al. 2000). These ecological, 
sociological, and governance ideas developed more or less in parallel with each other in their respective 
academic departments throughout the last forty years and it has been the work of coastal management 
theorists to synthesize them into a unified theory capable of dealing effectively with the challenges that 
coastal management practitioners must confront in their day to day activities. Admittedly this 
synthesizing process, now roughly 20 years old, is still ongoing. Indeed even referring to an ICM 
theory or ICM "theorists" is somewhat misleading in that ICM's principles do not come from and 
explicit or unique foundational theory per se but are instead drawn from a variety of ecological, socio-
political, and administrative/governance ideas. 
Nevertheless the work of these ICM synthesizers has certainly provided a coastal management 
system, even if incomplete, that is far superior to that which dominated in the 1950s and 60s. At that 











guidance for the formulation of coastal management objectives. It was believed that the natural world 
and its ecological systems could be divided up into neat administrative units and that each of these 
units could be managed by a team of scientific experts whose job it was to maintain some scientifically 
derived "optimal state." A good example of this strictly scientific approach in the field of Coastal 
Management has been the development of fisheries management controls such as the determination of 
Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for selected fisheries resources. This control measure seeks to fix the 
tonnage of a particular marine or coastal species that can be caught annually. It is based on a stock 
assessment which relies on data such as size of fish harvested, frequency of catch, length of fishing 
event and information on fishing gear. However, in the 40 years since their creation, TACs have 
proven to be an insufficient and even at times counter-productive, coastal management tool. (Healy & 
Hennessey 1998) Although TACs remain an important in the suite of tools employed to manage coastal 
and tishery systems, ICM's very development was a response to the recognized failure of TACs, and 
the technocratic coastal management system of which they were a part. 
Yet to date, ICM itself has also largely failed to achieve its goal of providing an effective 
alternative strategy to the above technocratic management system. In its 20 years of implementation, 
ICM has failed to sustainably manage the world's coastal environments. (Belfiore 2003, Bille & 
Mermet 2002, Olsen et al \998). Almost without exception the quality of coastal environments 
around the world are becoming more degraded (Millennium 2005). Admitting this failure, however, 
need not mean abandoning ICM's prescriptions. For ICM is not simply concerned with the ecological 
sustainability of its management efforts but also with its social sustainability. And without question 
ICM's management methods in this socio-political regard are far superior to the previous technocratic 
system. Yet any coastal management system that is incapable of producing sustainable management 
of both the ecological, socio-economical, and governance aspects of coastal environments cannot be 
considered complete. Therefore ICM proponents need to learn from their failures and develop more 
sophisticated understandings of what exactly they are calling for and what is required to effectively 
implement its policies. 
This is particularly true when ICM is implemented in the developing, as opposed to the 
developed, world. Although seen by many as vehicle for social empowerment (Jentoft, 2005), ICM 
theory and practice is a product of western academics and coastal management practitioners whose own 
socio-economic, political, and cultural environments are vastly different from those in most developing 
countries. This has important ramifications for ICM proponents who seek to implement ICM projects 
in the developing world. Unfortunately to date ICM proponents have been slow to recognize, and 











and cultural discrepancies between developed and developing countries. Particularly because ICM 
itself highlights the need for a holistic approach to coastal management, it should be expected of ICM 
practitioners that they adopt a more sophisticated and holistic approach to project implementation in 
the developing world. To do this ICM practitioners need to corne to better understandings of both the 
implications of their own ICM principles and the developing world environments in which they seek to 
implement that theory. One aspect of ICM to which this learning process is particularly important is 
ICM's call for greater interorganizational coordination. In a developing world context the 
organizations that ICM states must coordinate their actions are extremely diverse and relate to eacho 
ther in rather unique ways because of this diversity and because of how organizations in the 
development arena are structured. These two factors create challenges to interorganizational 
coordination that have not been discussed in the academic ICM literature. Therefore this dissertation 
seeks to begin that discussion. 
1.2 Aim of Dissertation 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the theoretical ideas underpinning ICM 
with respect to of the notion of interorganizational coordination. This will be done by attempting to 
identify the challenges to such coordination in ICM initiatives specifically in the developing world. 
One of the hallmarks of an ICM approach is its insistence that effective and broadly inclusive 
interorganizational networks are crucial to creating sustainable coastal management efforts (Sowman & 
Hauck 2003, Jentoft 2005). Yet difficulties in achieving such effective networks on the ground is one 
of the most cited 'problem areas' identified by veteran ICM proponents (Bille & Mermet 2002). 
Simply stated people active in the coastal management arena are not working very well together and 
frustratingly they generally don't know why or how to improve their relations. This study thus seeks 
to find out why interorganizational coordination is so difficult to achieve and how it can be improved. 
1.3 Structure and Objectives of Dissertation 
First, this study will give a short history of coastal management evolution, theory and practice. 
Because this study is interested in interorganizational relations in coastal management, this section will 











coastal management practice. In particular this literature review will focus on how and why ICM 
theorists have sought to legitimize the inclusion of social and political concerns into coastal 
management practice. Providing this background information will situate this study's objectives within 
the broader lCM academic literature and will also begin to point to why ICM might be having such 
'people' problems in the first place. 
Second, this study will examine the work of selected academic researchers who specialize in 
trying to understand how and why people work together. This field of research has been labeled by its 
investigators as lnterorganizational Relations (lOR). Surprisingly, this literature has not been widely 
discussed by lCM theorists. Here is where this study seeks to make its greatest contribution to the 
lCM literature by investigating the applicability of lOR theory to lCM practice. A key question this 
study seeks to answer is whether lOR theories can be helpful to ICM proponents in developing more 
sophisticated understandings about the interorganizational relationship dynamics present in lCM 
initiatives. Can it assist ICM proponents to identify the challenges that are frustrating effective 
interorganizational coordination in ICM initiatives? And can lOR theories then give useful insights to 
ICM proponents on how to foster more effective interorganizational networks in those ICM initiatives? 
Third, in order to answer the above questions this study will document and then attempt to 
interpret the interorganizational relations of a current lCM project in the Southwest of Madagascar 
through the lens of lOR theory. It is this study's hope that lOR theory will give ICM proponents a 
more sophisticated understanding of the IORs that are occurring in their ICM projects. In practice, 
this dissertation's interpretative process will not be one of data first, analysis second. One's theoretical 
understanding of a situation inevitably influences how one experiences it. Rather the approach to the 
study will be iterative. The lOR literature will be read and referred to contemporaneously with the 
collection of data. The potential challenges, conditions, or relationship dynamics that the lOR 
literature highlights as important, will also guide the data collection process. 
Finally, this study will suggest that lOR theory'S 'lenses' are useful in clarifying how and why 
the interorganizational relations are operating in this dissertation's case study, a Malagasy ICM 
initiative. Furthermore this study will identify those challenges frustrating the interorganizational 
relations in that ICM initiative and try to pull some insights from lOR theory on how those relations 
can be made more effective. It is this study'S assumption that if the lOR literature is useful in 
explaining how and why interorganizational networks operate in ICM initiatives, then its 













The research conducted for this dissertation included a three-month field study from mid-
November of 2007 through mid-February of 2008. During this time the author personally lived and 
worked with the employees of ReefDoctor, a small British marine conservation focused NGO, in the 
village of lfaty in the Bay of Ranobe in Southwest Madagascar. This NGO is engaged in a long-term 
IeM initiative in Ranobe Bay that will henceforth for the sake of simplicity be referred to as the 
"Ranobe Project". Living in the area for three months enabled the author to meet with a variety of 
people active in, and affected by, coastal management issues generally and specifically issues 
surrounding the IeM initiative in Ranobe Bay. The overarching goal of this research was not to 
evaluate the level or effectiveness of the interorganizational coordination in the IeM initiative. 
Rather, this study focused on documenting the character and extent of the interorganizational relations 
present in the leM initiative and the conditions under which those relations were occurring. It is this 
data that the author will subject to analysis and interpretation using theories from the lOR literature. 
Research methods included documenting personal observations of the Ranobe Project's 
implementation in a journal, collecting and analyzing relevant published as well as gray literature, 
conducting both tape-recorded and "off-the-record" non-tape recorded semi-structured interviews with 
key stakeholders, and the formulation and administration of a questionnaire to collect information from 
local villagers. All the data collected should be considered strictly qualitative. 
This author's personal general observations and documentation of conversations and events 
form an important information base for this study. A daily record of important events and 
conversations pertaining to the Ranobe project and generally to matters of coastal management in 
Ranobe Bay was compiled and updated regularly. The time-specific comments and impressions of 
involved individuals and their evolution over the three-month study period were noted down in order to 
keep track of the various issues that arose during the initial stages of the Ranobe project's 
implementation. 
Second, a review of gray and published literature proved valuable in terms of gathering 
background information on Ranobe Bay and in terms of understanding the guideline documents which 
informed the working relationships amongst organizations involved in coastal management in the 
regIOn. ReefDoctor in particular had a host of unpublished information that proved vital to this 
research. Relevant government legislation and regulations were also collected and reviewed. And 











and funders, such as the World Bank, and the Global Environment Fund (GEF) provided useful 
contextual information. 
Third, tape-recorded one-on-one interviews were conducted with fourteen individuals 
connected to the Ranobe project, each lasting around one hour. A list of these individuals and their 
affiliations is available in the Appendix. [n most instances it was also possible to have an additional 
non-tape recorded "off-the-record" interview with each of these individuals and indeed such interviews 
proved very fruitful in terms of providing additional, perhaps less filtered information. The interviews 
were conducted in order to gain an understanding of the attitudes, preferences, and knowledge that key 
stakeholders in the Ranobe Project had of ICM's principles and with particular reference to ICM's call 
for broad interorganizational coordination. 
Finally, a questionnaire was formulated and conducted amongst local villagers in order to assess 
their level of understanding of coastal management, its issues, and in particular the extent to which they 
believed they were participants involved in 'co-managing' their coastal environment. This survey was 
conducted by a local Malagasy university student in the local language on this author's behalf. The 
responses to this questionnaire were subsequently translated into English by ReetDoctor staff in 
consultation with this study's author. 
1.5 Limitations to study 
There were a number of limitations that constrained the type and quality of data collected. 
First, this author is not fluent in either of the two most dominantly spoken languages in Madagascar, 
Malagasy and French. [n practice this was not much of a problem in conducting the one-on-one 
interviews as most of the interviewees, being people of some considerable standing and education, 
were conversant in English. Moreover for the interviews that were conducted with local villagers who 
were not conversant in English, ReefDoctor employees graciously provided their time to assist with 
translations. Nevertheless, the author's ability to personally interact with, and gain information from 
most of the local population, was limited. Second, the relatively short period of in-country research 
constrained both the amount of data collected and the time over which the author could observe the 
implementation of the project being investigated. Finally, simply living and researching in as remote 
a setting as the village of Ifaty entails dealing with a host of technical and practical limitations that 
curtailed even the most conservative expectations of this study'S author. Nevertheless, given all of 











relations operating in the Ranobe Project. 
2. Coastal Management: Evolution, Theory and Recent Development 
2.1 The Beginnings of Early Coastal Management Activities 
Coastal Management, if defined broadly, has a very long history probably beginning sometime 
in the 15 th or 16th centuries during the European Age of Exploration. The ships that sailed the oceans 
at that time in search of treasure generally found it in far off lands and started trying to bring it home. 
In order to make sure that all that treasure got home countries began signing agreements with each 
other and drew lines on maps in order to demarcate their bounty from that of their neighbors. These 
agreements and boundaries can be considered the first coastal management laws and regulations and it 
is important to note that they were made in order to maintain an economic flow from the New World 
and elsewhere to Europe and to promote peace by regulating power at sea. Economics and politics, 
not any modern notions such as environmental sustainability or even natural resources management, 
provided the impetus for the first attempts at a system of coastal management. 
I f we fast forward 450 years or so to post WWII 1945 and the advent of modern coastal 
management, the picture hasn't change all that much. Following an American declaration that it had 
exclusive economic rights over the North American continental shelf which extends some 200 miles 
beyond its terrestrial borders, an international scramble for the Earth's oceans ensued (Environmental 
1998). Hoping to bring some order to this unruly situation, the United Nations began holding 
conferences at which all countries could negotiate with each other coastal management regulations and 
demarcate lines of territorial jurisdiction. The first of these many meetings occurred in 1958 and the 
last was held in 1994. Following that final meeting, the last iteration of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) was agreed upon by most of the world's nations. This Convention 
sets down the basic ground rules for coastal management at an international level that is still valid 
today. It is important to note here that the impetus for these modern coastal management laws came 
not from any ecological concern for the coasts themselves (although sustainable use of marine 
resources was increasingly becoming an issue of concern) but because of economic, political, and 
social, considerations. Coastal management was only "coastal" by virtue of its location, not because it 
had any specific concern for the coasts as natural systems. 
So in retrospect it may seem rather odd that after the politicians defined coastal boundaries at 











expertise was not politics or economics, or even social science, but natural science. In terms of this 
study it is not necessary to discuss why this occurred but it is important to note that it did. Seemingly, 
without notice, the practice of coastal management became dominated by experts from the so-called 
"hard sciences" of biology, chemistry and physics (Kennedy, 1991). 
2.2 Early Modern Coastal Management 
In some ways it should be not surprising then that these scientists learned quickly that they had 
been given a very difficult job for which they were ill equipped to handle. Ultimately after around 
thirty years of effort, the complexities of a technocratic approach to coastal management became 
overwhelming. Scientific coastal management in the 1950s and 60s was based upon the modernist 
idea that with adequate sound, scientifically derived information, people (usually scientists) would be 
able to, and choose to, make decisions that met their management objectives. In the case of coastal 
management under these natural scientists, those objectives were to protect the long-term sustainability 
of coastal and marine ecosystems and their resources. However, the simple logic that good data in the 
hands of rational people ensures proper management proved incredibly naive. 
reasons for this but in terms of this study an exhaustive discussion is not necessary. 
will suffice. 
There are many 
A brief outl ine 
The first, and probably most demoralizing reason for scientists, was that arriving at "good 
science" in the coastal and marine realm was a lot more difficult than they first conceived. The 
formulation of a Total Allowable Catch (TAe), for example, which is the cornerstone of conventional 
fisheries management, based upon estimates of fish stock size, proved fiendishly difficult to calculate 
accurately due to a series of confounding complexities inherent to most aquatic species and to the 
fisheries industry (Healy & Hennessey 1998). Further discussion on the complexities of providing 
accurate scientific information are beyond the scope of this study, but the principle that accurate 
scientific data is not always attainable, is very pertinent to this study. 
The second problem that confronted scientists, and the often very centralized governments that 
supported them, was that the one animal/species that they hadn't studied all that much was giving them 
the most trouble, namely the human fisher. Especially when it became increasingly known that 
scientific data might be up for debate, fishers, who already had a vested interest in discounting 
doomsday scientific reports from the likes of Ehrlich (1971) and other neo-Malthusian scientists, 











management regimes (McCay, 1980). Furthermore because the coastal realm is so difficult to police 
these fishers became fairly adept at establishing their own coastal management rules (Pomeroy et. al. 
1997). In the academic literature this conflict between coastal resource users and coastal resource 
managers has been framed in two opposing, ways. Either economic and political forces, i.e. fishers, 
have successfully controlled coastal management policy despite the efforts of ecologically minded 
coastal managers (Ludwig et al 1993), or distant scientists and centralized governments have tried to 
impose undemocratic and elitist policies on fishers who are just trying to feed their families (Nichols 
\999). 
Finally, scientists were having trouble effectively managing the coasts because so many of the 
problems affecting them originated from outside of the coastal manager's area of jurisdiction. For 
example, coastal development in the form of industrial or tourist facilities often entails altering a 
shoreline's natural features. The development of jetties, marinas, and artificial beaches, impact on the 
dynamic relationship between land and water in the coastal zone and often have secondary impacts. 
In situations where the inland population is dense and the coastline crowded coastal managers have 
been in the unenviable position of dealing with these higher order impacts, usually in the form of 
coastal pollution over which they have limited control (Lee \993). Coastal managers, from scientific 
backgrounds, are usually both disinclined, and professionally incapable of dealing with the social 
contlict that usually arises in these situations. 
This brief overview of the evolution of early Coastal Management thinking and practice over 
the last 50 years has highlighted a few points that are important to keep in mind. First coastal 
management began and has been for the majority of its existence a tool to attain political, economic, 
and social goals, not ecological ones. Second, despite its origins, modern coastal management began 
when politicians gave control of coastal management to natural scientists in the 1950s. Third, these 
scientists were charged with sustainably managing coastal resources although the term "sustainability" 
was not yet in vogue. In the first 30 years, and arguably up to the present, they have failed to do this. 
Fourth, this is largely because the enlightenment era inspired modernist belief that underpinned 
scientific inquiries, that good science, scientifically applied, leads to good management, proved naive 
for many reasons. Such a philosophy led to a coastal management regime which expected too much 
of the scientific method (Maler, 2000), created greater tension between resource users and resource 
managers which exacerbated coastal degradation (Jentoft et al. 1998), and has been incapable of 











2.3 A Response to Failure: ICM develops. 
The consequences of having adopted a technocratic, science-based approach to coastal 
management have been severe. In the fifty years since this approach's inception the integrity and 
biodiversity of coastal ecosystems have declined at an unprecedented rate. This is evident from data 
both in the developed and developing world. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) states 
that biodiversity losses "due to human activities were more rapid in the past 50 years than at any time 
in human history." Even more damning, the report goes on to state that the drivers of this biodiversity 
loss "are either steady, show no evidence of declining over time, or are increasing in intensity" (2005). 
The irony is clear; at the same time that we have unprecedented knowledge about coastal and marine 
ecosystems, we also are destroying them at an equally unprecedented rate. 
Fortunately, concerns regarding the increasing degradation of coastal ecosystems were 
recognized nearly 20 years ago. The reasons why good science in the hands of rational people does 
not automatically equal good management are generally well understood, at least in some parts of the 
academic world. From a social science perspective, more sophisticated understandings of 
management and decision-making in general, formulated by authors such as Popper, Faludi, and 
Habermas, have existed and been debated for over 50 years (Hill, 2004). In the environmental 
sciences new, more dynamic, and less hierarchical ways of conceptualizing ecological interactions have 
replaced the earlier more rigid and static conceptions of the natural world. The influence of both these 
trends on coastal management thought and practice has been considerable. In the early 1980s, 
academics interested in improving coastal management practices used these more sophisticated 
understandings of how management works, and how decisions get made, (along with many other 
emerging ideas) to develop a different approach to coastal management. This approach eventually 
became known as Integrated Coastal Management OCM). In terms of this study the important 
developments that occurred during the creation of this new, integrated, approach to coastal 
management have to do with the re-inclusion of social and economic concerns as not only legitimate, 
but necessary elements to be considered in the formulation of any coastal management policy, program 
or plan. There are certainly many other aspects to ICM theory but they are rather beyond the scope of 
this study. 
To begin, the development of ICM was part of a larger paradigm shift in environmental 
management in general. The notions of integrated environmental management (IEM), and ICM, have 











will focus exclusively on ICM but some of the literature reviewed here has a more general focus on 
IEM. Integrated Coastal Management developed into a mature field of study in the later part of the 
1980s and into the 90s. During the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
Earth Summit (1992), lCM ideas were thoroughly discussed and recommendations for enhancing lCM 
efforts were included in Agenda 2\. Following that summit, ICM gained international legitimacy and 
quickly became the "normative coastal development model" (Bille & Mermet, 2002). Since then, 
nearly 700 hundred IeM initiatives have been initiated throughout the world (Belfiore, 2003). 
Many definitions exist for what constitutes ICM, all with similar content, but different 
emphases. Yet even with such a massive proliferation of IeM programs and projects, in many 
important respects, lCM is still a consciously developing field and debates and discussions about its 
underlying theoretical and philosophical underpinnings are ongoing even today (Endter et al. 1998). 
Nevertheless, a fairly standard working definition of ICM is given by Davos (1998), citing the World 
Coast Conference of 1993. lCM is a "continuous and evolutionary process for achieving sustainable 
development, involving the comprehensive assessment, setting of objectives, planning and 
management of coastal systems and resources, taking into account traditional, cultural, and historical 
perspectives and conflicting interests and uses." The hallmark of this model, as its name suggests, is a 
call for greater integration. However defining just what "integration" means is not an easy task as 
different authors imbue it with different meanings. Like the term "sustainability" such a nebulous 
definition of "integration" is both a strength and weakness of leM theory. Nevertheless Cicin-Sain 
et al. (2000) have given a fairly comprehensive definition for integration by explaining it as having five 
"dimensions" or levels. If coastal management is to be effective, [eM authors argue, "integration" 
must occur at each level (Winsemius, 1995). 
The first level is "transectoral integration." The coastal realm is a very large place in which 
many different actors work and play. In order for coastal management policies to be effective, ICM 
theory states that these "sectors" must work together, and "integrate" their plans. A coastal oil refinery 
cannot operate without regard for the fishery industry, nor can the tourist, in his/her desire for pristine 
beaches, ignore the needs of industry for seaside ports, nor can coastal developers ignore the 
requirements of coastal ecosystems for undisturbed sand dunes. Instead, these various sectors need to 
work together and develop coastal management plans that address their respective goals without 
destroying those of the other sectors. Some level of compromise will inevitably be required to 
achieve all stated goals. 
The second level of integration called for is "intergovernmental integration." Here, ICM 











provincial, regional, and national, must integrate their policies and regulations so that they work in 
harmony towards one unified coastal management vision. 
The third level of integration required is "spatial integration." Here ICM theory states that 
early sectoral boundaries drawn for environmental management failed to take an "ecosystems" 
approach to coastal management (Griffis, 1996). Instead, geographical management boundaries were 
laid in a way that adhered more to administrative than ecological principles and processes. At a 
minimum, ICM calls for these administrative units to become more integrated, for more 
communication and coordination to occur between them. Ideally, however, ICM advocates that such 
administrative sectors should be wholly reorganized. An ecosystems based approach to coastal 
management would be one in which traditionally separate sectors, such fisheries management and 
riverine pollution management, were merged in a way that reflected the now recognized 
interdependencies between these two geographic regions (Sissenwine, 1996). 
The fourth level of integration is concerned with "science-management integration." Here, 
ICM theory states that the different scientific disciplines such as marine biology, marine oceanography, 
and even engineering and social science need to work more closely together with management entities. 
Previously environmental management was divided not only by spatially determined sectors but also 
along lines of scientific discipline. Social scientists, engineers and natural scientists, each with their 
own discipline specific jargon, and at least perceived distinct roles in environmental management, did 
their jobs without regard for each other's expertise (Mangel et al. 1996). 
The fifth and tinal level of integration called for is "international integration." Here ICM 
recognizes that environmental boundaries do not contine themselves to political boundaries. 
Therefore, countries must integrate their coastal management policies in order to effectively manage 
the global marine environment. At an even higher level lCM calls for multi-nation or even global 
level coastal management plans and polices such as those developed by the United Nations 
Conferences on the Laws of Sea (UNCLOS) and at other international conferences. Especially in 
light of global climate change, lCM theory states that international collaboration is essential. 
2.4 Homo sapiens become part of the coastal environment ... 
Having provided a broad definition for Integrated Coastal Management, this section of the 
review will focus on the aspects oflCM that are most pertinent to this study. Integration, at any of the 











coordination, in tum, requires paymg attention to the people and institutions through whom that 
coordination must occur. In recent years, ICM theorists have increasingly recognized this (Clark, 
1997). Accordingly, they have argued for paying greater attention to social science data, and for 
greater social inclusivity, when formulating coastal management plans and polices. Depending upon 
the author, the rationale in defense of this argument is either normative or practical or both. 
Understanding explicitly these rationales is important in terms of this study because they form the basis 
for why interorganizational coordination is necessary in coastal management. This study will first 
look at the normative rationale for social inclusivity. Thereafter, the practical reasons why such 
inclusivity and social science data are essential components of any coastal management project will be 
examined. 
In order to understand ICM theory's normative inclination for greater social inclusivity, it is 
necessary to briefly consider ICM's theoretical background. [CM theory, because of its 
transdisciplinary character, has developed in a very organic, almost haphazard manner over the past 
twenty years. It has not developed systematically from theory, to principles, to practice. Although 
certainly more than a mere critique of early modem coastal management, with a well-established set of 
principles and implementation guidance documents (Coastal 2000), ICM theory to this day is still 
developing in a very iterative and exploratory manner. Because of this, ICM theorists are still 
discovering the implications of many of the principles that they espouse and promote. This is especially 
true in terms of ICM's normative preference for social inclusivity in coastal management policy 
formulation and implementation. For, despite the many calls for such inclusion, and its enshrinement in 
indicator-based ICM evaluation methodology, (Hegarty, 1997; Chuenpagdee & lentoft 2007; Bowen, 
2003; Ehler 2003; Henocque 2003) few of these ICM theorists have critically investigated the rationale 
behind their calls for greater social inclusivity. Even when an author, such as lentoft (2005), does 
engage in some normative reflection, it is done only to recruit greater support for social inclusivity, for 
example by citing "empowerment literature," rather than to understand why ICM theory has a 
normative preference for it in the first place. 
Nevertheless, the existence of ICM theory's normative preference for social inclusivity, 
although poorly justified by [CM theorists in the literature, is certainly not difficult to understand. 
Clearly, rCM theory has not developed in a vacuum. It is the product of a western democratic and 
postmodern culture which is increasingly distrustful of expert technocrats and increasingly inclined, 
especially in its dealings with the "developing world," to promote social empowerment (Froger et aI., 
2004). As lentoft (2005) states, ICM theory is "all about...bringing previously excluded, 











making process by reshuffling power and responsibility ... " Yet, this rhetoric is not Jentoft's own, as he 
makes clear, nor is it even the product of other ICM theorists. Rather it has been borrowed uncritically 
from the broader western democratic culture of which ICM is a part. And at least within that culture, 
such rhetoric is so uncontroversial and self-evident that ICM theorists, it would seem, feel no need to 
justify it. For many, it is enough to simply state that social inclusivity is a normatively worthwhile, 
legitimacy-creating endeavor, and to depend upon the hegemony of western democratic culture to 
ensure that such statements will be convincing to their readers. 
Even if such normative reasons are not enough, lCM theory also has several practical reasons 
for why social inc\usivity and social science data are important components of any coastal management 
program. In general, coastal management practitioners have largely accepted these rationales as true. 
The ICM literature here does a much better job at explicitly justifying its practical rationales. It does 
this in two main ways. 
First, by adding social science data into the models used to understand and manage coastal 
ecosystems, ICM theory argues that these models become more accurate representations from which to 
formulate coastal management plans. A more sophisticated understanding of the coastal realm should 
lead to coastal management policies that are better able to account for all of these various elements. 
In a sense this is merely a continuation of the modernist philosophy that good information leads to 
better policies. The key difference is that [CM theory recognizes a broader range of "good" 
information than did the previous technocratic approach. 
The second way in which the inclusion of social science data is supposed to practically increase 
the effectiveness of coastal management policy and practice is by maximizing the legitimacy of those 
policies by recruiting the very user groups subject to them in their implementation and formulation 
(Portney, 1991). Termed "co-management" in the [CM literature, such an approach to coastal 
management purports to not only to be normatively preferable but also practically the only solution to 
effective management in an environment where enforcement of unpopular regulations is impossible 
both financially and technically (Hauck & Sowman 2003). This is especially true in the developing 
world where formal government capacity for coastal management is usually inadequate. 
2.5 Social inclusivity is not a panacea to coastal management woes 
However, despite efforts to take greater account of social science data and promote greater 











states bluntly that "the promises of rCM are not being achieved." Bille & Mermet (2002) state that 
"the apparent failure of rCM in many efforts worldwide in ensuring the environmental health of coastal 
ecosystems while obtaining benefits from coastal development..." demands that rCM proponents do 
some serious evaluation and re-evaluation of their past projects. Olsen et al. (1997) state that there is 
"very little information that demonstrates the effectiveness of ICM efforts ... " and even those successes 
that have occurred are "puny compared with the forces worldwide causing coastal degradation." The 
2003 World Parks Congress in Durban, while calling for a significant increase in the number of Marine 
Protected Areas (MPAs) worldwide, also acknowledged that "the effectiveness of MPA management 
needs to substantially improve." 
In terms of this study, the point of highlighting these remarks is not to argue against greater 
social inclusivity or the use of social science data in coastal management. The normative and 
practical reasons for doing so, as outlined above, remain convincing. Nevertheless, if rCM is to be 
successful in the future it needs to embrace these arguments with greater sophistication and with an 
understanding of their limitations. 
The normative argument is limited by the fact that the dominant pillar of Western culture, 
namely that individuals have a right to influence the rules by which they live and that through 
democratic processes those rules gain legitimacy, is not a universally accepted belief. Especially in 
many parts of the developing world, different cultural norms and processes produce normative 
legitimacy. Therefore, it may be naive to assume that greater social inclusivity will either be accepted 
or practically useful in many parts of the world. 
The practical argument is also limited. Conceptually, the emergmg field of Complexity 
Theory (Cilliers, 2000) has taught us that complex systems, such as coastal environments, will not 
necessarily be better understood by acquiring more data. The accuracy of our understanding of 
coastal systems and our ability to better manage them may not practically improve by including social 
science data. A full discussion of Complexity theory is beyond the scope of this study but its 
arguments are not without cogency (Cilliers, 2000). 
Second, it must be acknowledged that the validity of the above practical rationales is testable. 
Unfortunately, despite an impressive number of rCM programs and initiatives throughout the globe, 
monitoring, evaluating, and drawing lessons from those programs in a systematic manner has only just 
begun (Olsen et al., 1997). Although conceptually convincing it is not prudent to accept the validity 











2.6 The challenge of interorganizational collaboration 
Moving closer to the focus of this thesis, it should not be surpnsmg that, given the 
unsophisticated way in which social considerations have heretofore been espoused, interorganizational 
collaboration in rCM initiatives is often ineffective (Bille & Mermet 2002). Studies have shown that 
the character of the collaboration envisioned in rCM literature is often far from that which is actually 
occurring on the ground. Co-management efforts are often one-sided with minimal or reluctant 
government involvement (Sowman & Hauck 2003) or the organizations setup to facilitate 
interorganizational collaboration fail (Bille, Mermet 2002). The reasons for these failures have not been 
adequately discussed in the rCM literature. However, they have been thoroughly investigated 
elsewhere. Academics from fields such as organizational theory, administrative theory, and business 
and management science (Turner, 2000) have all devoted considerable attention to the challenges 
encountered in interorganizational relations. [f rCM theory is to develop a better understanding of why 
interorganizational coordination is failing in [CM initiatives it may be fruitful to learn from the 
experiences and studies of these other disciplines. 
3. Interorganizational Relations Theory: a Review of the Literature 
The same industrialization and consequent economic growth that induced the original 
territoralization of the open seas in the 1950s that resulted in the UNCLOS (1994) also created a need 
to better understand how industries could secure diverse resources. Following WWII, the increasing 
complexity of industrial supply chains highlighted the interorganizational dependency of most modern 
economic, and even socio-political pursuits (Whetten, 1981). In order to maintain these economic 
supply chains or induce effective political or social change, people need sophisticated understandings 
of how different organizations can relate to each other and under what circumstances those relations 
occur. From this need, the academic field of Interorganizational Relations (lOR) was born 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985). Because of the breadth of its object of study lOR, like ICM, is by definition 
transdisciplinary. Academics from various fields such as administrative theory, management science, 
implementation theory, sociology and economics, have all made contributions to understanding how 
organizations relate to each other. Furthermore, because of its utilitarian origins much of the lOR 
literature is prescriptive, especially when undertaken by administrative or management theorists 











order to more efficiently produce some output, whether economic, social, or political. In terms of this 
study this orientation is particularly helpful in that it will assist in identifying how lCM can better 
establish effective laRs in its programs. 
However before reviewing the lOR literature it is important to identify exactly the type of 
laRs that lCM theory states is required in order to achieve effective coastal management. Doing this 
is important because lCM's vision of laRs has served as the criteria for selecting the literature 
reviewed in this study. lCM theory is not simply advocating for more and improved laRs, but for 
more of a certain type of laRs. For this study, that type needs to be explicitly identified. 
In agreement with the prescriptions of administrative and managerial theorists, [CM theory 
begins defining its demands for laRs by reiterating that the problems of the modern era, whether 
political, economic, or environmental, are too complex to be solved without effective 
interorganizational collaboration (Westley & Vredenburg, 1997). lCM calls for interorganizational 
collaboration at all levels, national, regional, and local, and in both civil and private sectors (Cicin-Sain 
et af., 2000). However, ICM theory also places a specific emphasis on the desirability of what it 
terms co-management and the principle of subsidiarity (Hegarty, 1997). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, especially in a developing world context, ICM is seen by some as a vehicle for the 
"empowerment" of marginalized peoples (lenton, 2005). Co-management advocates argue for 
"bottom-up" management arrangements where local resource users are actively engaged in sustainably 
managing their resources (Hauck and Sowman, 2003). The principle of subsidiarity, oft cited by [CM 
theorists, states that management responsibility should rest at the lowest level possible (Noble, 2000). 
Most co-management theorists do not insist that local resource users have an equal footing as 
government in managing coastal resources, but they do argue for a greater role. Public interest groups, 
government, artisanal resource users, and larger private enterprise all need to work together towards 
what [CM says should be their shared interest in sustainable coastal management. The balance of 
power between these entities will vary depending upon local conditions but generically no stakeholder, 
or even group of stakeholders, should have a controlling influence over any other. lCM's ideal is that 
[ORs in ICM initiatives be coordinating efforts. If there is one dominant call throughout the lCM 
literature, it is for more communication, coordination and collaboration. In terms of this study 
therefore the first point of discussion in the realm of lOR theory should be concerned with developing a 
sophisticated understanding of exactly what coordination means. Only with this in hand will it be 











3.1 Towards a better understanding of Ielv! coordination 
In their article about natural resource management, Honadle and Cooper (1989) talk extensively 
about coordination. Here, they define coordination as the types of transactions that occur between 
"equals involved in some sort of voluntary endeavor." They emphasize that such transactions "cannot 
be imposed" and that the organizations involved in them must at least theoretically have "alternatives" 
to entering into such transactions. They go on to discern three types of coordination. 
The most basic type of coordination is "information sharing." Here organizations simply 
communicate with each other about their operations. Information sharing can be formal or informal 
and is the most fundamental pathway towards coordination. The second, and a slightly more involved 
form of coordination, is "resource sharing." Because resources cost money the level of trust and 
communication between organizations engaged in this activity is generally higher. The final, closest 
type, of coordination is "joint-action." Here organizations jointly undertake a single operation sharing 
both resources and information. 
Besides the fact that most ICM theorists do not insist that all involved organizations be 
strictly "equal," this three-tiered definition of coordination fits fairly well with that envisioned in the 
ICM literature. Accordingly, it will serve as the dominant paradigm through which this study 
understands the term. Taking the time to develop this basic typology is necessary in terms of this study 
because, as Honadle and Cooper state, the "three types of coordination are not equally difficult." If 
we are to have a sophisticated understanding of the challenges to interorganizational coordination in 
ICM we must recognize that different types of coordination will require different degrees of effOli and 
enabling conditions. Furthermore, particularly in the development arena, coordination is often a 
poorly defined "buzz word." It means different things to different people and is sometimes 
inappropriately used to describe relations that even a cursory investigation would find devoid of any 
real communication. Consequently it is essential for this study to have an explicit definition of 
coordination that is compatible with ICM thinking in order to analyze the case study. 
With such a definition in hand the lOR literature can be surveyed in order to see how it says 
laRs capable of the above coordination, can be nurtured. To begin, this study will start with two 
theorists. Neither academic deals directly with laRs themselves but rather with the contexts within 
which such relations occur. This is because both authors have recognized that the contexts largely 
determine the character of laRs. In terms of this study, understanding how different contexts can 











sophisticated understanding of IORs. 
3.2 Warren :s' structural contexts 
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Adaptedj'rom: Warren, 1967 
First this study will discuss the idea's put forward by Roland Warren (1967). Working in the 
field of administrative theory, he developed a typology that identifies four different structural contexts 
in which IORs can occur (Warren 1967). 
First, and most structured, is the "unitary" context. Here IORs occur within a context of 
structured hierarchy with a central, dominant, authority figure. The objectives of that central authority 
guide the actions of the subsidiary organizations in the hierarchy. The communication and 
coordination between these organizations is obligatory because they all must report to a single central 
authority. Furthermore, the individual departmental objectives are usually rationally dependent upon 
the success of the overarching objectives of the central authority. 
Warren labels the second, slightly less structured context, "federated." Here, lOR's occur in a 
context where individual organizations voluntarily and individually decide to organize themselves into 
a larger federation. This arrangement is usually formally constituted by the creation of a coordinating 











Often there is a set of principles which must be adhered to by all members of the federation and which 
guides inter-member relations. 
The third, even less structured, type of IORs occurs within a "coalitional" context. In this 
context, autonomous organizations have seen it to their advantage to align themselves with other 
organizations to achieve a larger goal. Each unit has total operational autonomy and the collaboration 
requires no binding agreements, voluntarily given or otherwise. There may be ad hoc memorandum 
of understanding created and informal division of labor agreements made in order to more effectively 
accomplish the shared objective but such agreements are time and objective specific and usually 
require a minimum of intra-organizational restructuring. Nevertheless, the organizations operating in 
such contexts can develop fairly close relations with each other through multiple collaborative efforts. 
Finally, the least structured context in which IORs occur is that of "social-choice." Such 
contexts occur when organizations, in order to satisfy internal operational goals, seek out other 
organizations. These partner organizations may have no specific shared operational goals or even 
sympathies. The [ORs that occur here are usually informal, time, and objective specific, and require 
little documentation or regulation. Organizational autonomy is never compromised in this context, 
and there is never any authority mandating, or even societal prescription advocating for collaboration. 
This typology is particularly useful in terms of this study because it provides a starting point 
from which to begin analyzing the specific case study under review. Again, the context in which 
[ORs occur is critical to understanding their character and how they function. IORs in a "federative" 
context will be very different to IORs in a "social-choice" context." In terms of ICM theory, the 
community based co-management structures that ICM calls for are best suited to the middle two of 
Warren's four structural contexts. A "Unitary Context" is too reminiscent of the old technocratic 
approach to coastal management, while the "Social-Choice Context" is probably too unstructured to be 
capable of implementing a reliable coastal management program. 
least initially, are found, not chosen, by potential [CM implementers. 
However, Warren's contexts, at 
The contexts within which any 
given [CM project is operating may not be the ideally "federated" or "coalitional", contexts. 
Therefore, being able to identify the structural context within which this dissertation's case study is 











3.3 A,fatland:<; Policy Penpective 
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Moving from structural context to policy context, Matland (1995), an administrative theorist, 
also provides useful insights on the subject. Instead of taking as his starting point the structural 
context in which any given lOR may occur, Matland (1995) focuses his work on analyzing the policies 
or programs that provide the impetus for laRs in the first place. Matland (1995) states that the context 
in which laRs operate largely depend upon the character of the transactions or policies themselves. 
Situating his model within Implementation Studies, Matland tries to reconcile what he calls the long-
standing debate between "top-downers" and "bottom-uppers" by focusing not on the process by which 
an objective is achieved but on the character of the objective itself. The debate to which Matland 
refers is simply the previously discussed trend in the West, clearly visible in coastal management 
policy, away from technically rational, hierarchal implementation systems to more decentralized, 
adaptive, and holistic implementation systems (Olsen 1970). Instead of picking sides in this debate, 
Matland (1995) recognizes that there are numerous ways to achieve a specified objective. Any debate 
that polarizes people into two positions is too simplistic. Furthermore, Matland argues that by focusing 
on a normative stand for one position or the other and arguing from there, theorists can easily miss a 
very important dynamic that occurs in every implementation process. For the issue with attaining any 











rather in determining the way to do it that is most acceptable to all parties involved. This is an 
important insight worth noting. Furthermore, Matland's model is important because it claims to 
predict the structural context that is likely to develop based upon the character of the objective that is to 
be implemented. This is useful because it tells ICM policymakers, who are seeking to sustainably 
manage coastal ecosystems in a "bottom-up" manner, to pay careful attention not just to the process by 
which their policies are formulated but to the policy content that comes out of such processes. For 
whatever the policy formulation process, the character of the policy created will determine the 
structural context needed for its successful implementation. 
Matland's (1995) model, entitled the "Ambiguity-Contlict Model of Policy Implementation" 
states that the structure used to successfully implement any policy will be determined by the level of 
ambiguity and contlict inherent to that policy. Ambiguity here refers to the clarity of a policy's 
procedures, objectives and guiding principles. One might expect that any well-formulated policy 
would seek to maximize such clarity. However, the academic literature is full of examples where 
policy formulators have deliberately left vague certain elements of a policy or program, usually in an 
attempt to either increase its acceptability or ease its implementation. Contlict on the other hand refers 
to the amount of controversy a policy's procedures, objectives, or guiding principles are likely to create 
amongst the stakeholders affected by it. Unlike ambiguity, policymakers almost always seek to avoid 
controversy when formulating and implementing policy. 
From these two variables Matland (1995) derives four different policy contexts. Each context 
has a different set of variables that are important if one wants to successfully implement the said 
policy's objectives. If we proceed roughly along Warren's contextual categories from most to least 
structured, Matland's first somewhat analogous policy type is one of low ambiguity and low contlict. 
Policies or programs that are neither ambiguous nor conflictual enjoy widespread acceptance. 
Implementation therefore is simply a matter of organization and resources. This policy context is 
amenable to what Matland calls "administrative implementation." Similar to Warren's "unitary 
context" administrative implementation is characterized by a central authority that delegates tasks to 
subsidiary organizations. What is interesting to note here is that Matland states that a unitary structure 
is the product of "good," or at least clear and popular policy, rather than an instrument through which 
"bad," or at least unpopular, policy is imposed. The administrative context is the "top-downers" ideal, 
clear policy derived from certain data both of which are accepted by the majority of a rational society. 
Matland's second policy context is characterized by policies that are unambiguous and highly 
contlictual. Matland says that in these situations sufficient power, and who has it, is the most 











Matland's typology diverges from Warren's quite strikingly. If a policy is highly conflictual and its 
objectives, means, and guiding principles are all very clear, then its successful implementation is 
simply a matter of having enough power to force all required organizations to perform their various 
tasks and keep opponents from interfering in those tasks. What is interesting here is that Matland 
does not seem to care very much about the origins of such power, perhaps recognizing that it can be 
derived from various ways in various contexts. This perspective is somewhat in tension with the 
negative picture usually painted about top-down implementation systems. At least from a bottom-
uper's view the use of dominating power is usually tied to a distant, mechanistic, and highly hierarchal, 
administration. However Matland's model, by focusing on policy contexts, doesn't allow for such a 
characterization. Rather administrative contexts are the product of "good" and "bad" policy, or again 
at least highly conflictual, policies create situations where raw power is needed to coerce or pay-off 
opposed parties. This power dominating dynamic works the same wherever the source of power may 
come from. Narrowly democratically derived policies can create such power, autocratic means can 
create such power, a grassroots participatory process can create such power, or a multitude of other 
factors can. 
At least from this study's perspective, it is not clear whether this can be justifiably labeled to be 
part of a satisfactory synthesis of the "top-down" and "bottom-up" positions, as Matland hopes, but it 
does neatly shed a different perspective on the issues under discussion. Moreover, this insight is 
important because it potentially complicates both ICM's normative, and even its practical preference, 
for "bottom-up" approaches to coastal management. Unambiguous, but highly conflictual polices, 
even if derived from a "bottom-up" process, will still rely upon, if we embrace Matland's thinking, the 
use of dominating power for successful implementation. Not only is this arguably problematic from a 
normative standpoint, it is also, as has been discussed previously, practically difficult in the coastal 
realm. Contrary to ICM theory's hopes, Matland states that the process by which a policy is 
formulated may not change the dynamic by which it can be successfully implemented. More 
important from Matland's point of view, in terms of implementation, is the content of the policy itself 
rather than the process by which it was formulated. 
Matland's third policy context refers to policies that are highly ambiguous and minimally 
conflictual. Matland states that implementation in this policy context will be highly experimental and 
dependent on other contextual issues. These issues may include local capacity, access to resources, 
how the policy objectives are interpreted by the various implementing organizations, and the ability of 
those organizations to innovate. Many development projects can be accurately placed in this category 











impoliant. In such contexts, organizations must be able to effectively innovate and define solutions and 
means to achieve, in some sense, the stated, albeit amorphous, objectives. However, in this context, 
Matland also emphasizes the importance of institutional learning over achieving "success" in terms of 
some list of objectives. Matland states that it is dangerous to force such implementation processes to 
"deliver" concretely identifiable outcomes. The context within which the implementing organizations 
are working is too vague and compliance to such outcomes is likely to be superficial. On the other 
hand, Matland does caution that policy ambiguity can cause poor project accountability that in turn 
leads to the creation of "mini fiefdoms with [individual organization] leaders pursuing their own 
interests." In this context, Matland argues that the "bottom-up description of the policy 
implementation process is superior to the top-down." If one is interested in some sort of "successful" 
implementation here, then Matland argues that paying attention to "local-level actors," their needs, 
desires, and capabilities is most necessary. Finally, interorganizational collaboration here is not going to 
be dependent on power utilization. Rather shared organizational sympathies and the ability of those 
organizations to cooperatively define distinct roles for themselves will be critical to effective 
interorganizational collaboration. 
Matland's fourth and final policy context is one of high ambiguity and high conflict. One 
might be tempted to dismiss any policy as hopelessly flawed that was both highly controversial and 
highly vague but just as ambiguity has its uses so do so-called "symbolic" policies. Citing Olsen 
(1970), Matland states that some policies are purposely designed to be contlictual and vague. 
Nevertheless, this policy context is not broadly applicable because implementation within it is hard to 
predict and liable to "getting out of contro\." If "success" is to be achieved, Matland states that the 
most important factor here is coalitional strength. Because policy objectives are unclear individual 
organizations must be able to work together simply on the basis of principle rather than operational 
necessity. This requires a high level of normative sympathies amongst participating organizations. 
However, such sympathies are often strained in this context because policy ambiguity tends to create 
intra-coalitional conflict. Divergent individual interpretations of policy objectives by organizations 
with different expertise within the implementing coalition often cause this contlict. Because resources 
are finite each organization fights for its preferred method of implementation based upon its own 
interpretation of the pol icy's specific goals. In terms of interorganizational collaboration, this is a 
very difficult policy context within which to operate. The challenges to effective ICM-style IORs are 
potentially numerous. Furthermore, Matland states that, without a change in policy content, the only 
solution to these challenges is "strength" namely the same dominating power dynamic that is at work in 











such characteristics will certainly foster contlict and be challenges to successful laRs. 
These four policy contexts are useful not only because they provide a different model from 
Warren's structural contexts (1967) by which to categorize the contextual characteristics of this 
dissertations case study, but also because, even at the theoretical level, they provide rationales for, and 
insights into, the challenges that may arise in it. Nevertheless, Matland's model does not seem to 
have provided a broadly accepted synthesis, and hence alternative to the "top-down" vs. "bottom-up" 
debate. Most of the other academic literature reviewed below continues to situate itself somewhere 
along the "bottom-up/top-downo, continuum. 
The above two contextual models are a good second step towards developing a sophisticated 
understanding of laRs for ICM. Context obviously matters. However, further analysis requires us 
to focus directly upon the laRs themselves. The next section reviews the ideas of Brinkerhoff (1996) 
who has developed a basic typology that identifies different types of challenges that occur in laRs. 
3.4 Understanding Conflicts 
Brinkerhoff (1996), a development practitioner and consultant, states that there are three kinds 
of threats to interorganizational collaboration. The first he calls the 'threat to autonomy.' This threat 
is probably the most fundamental and widely agreed upon assumption that permeates all lOR theory. 
Organizations almost instinctively seek to limit their interorganizational dependencies because they are 
perceived to impede operational efficiency (Brinkerhoff, 1996; Molnar and Rogers, 1979). Simply 
stated, it is the nature of organizations to be averse to interorganizational relationships. If an 
organization can accomplish its goals alone it will almost always do so. This inclination continues to 
exist despite the previously mentioned widespread recognition that the complexity of the modern world 
requires interorganizational coordination. Furthermore this instinct, to foreshadow the findings of this 
study, continues to exist even in realms where the academic literature refuting it is well developed such 
as in ICM initiatives. For coordination, even of the most minimal, information-sharing, variety entails 
extra efforts to be made by individual organizations. When time and resources are finite these extra 
efforts necessarily cause a reduction in the internal operational capacity of an organization. In order 
to make such a sacrifice worthwhile the overall operational capacity of an organization must be seen to 
be greater with coordination than without it. And although lOR literature forcefully argues that IORs 
do indeed expand overall organizational capacity, in practice the structural and operational contlicts 











Organizations, while acknowledging the desirability of laRs, often nonetheless limit such transactions 
in practice, preferring internal expansion to increased external coordination. In terms of this study 
recognizing this tendency will be important. 
The second reason that Brinkerhoff (1996) gives for interorganizational conflict is a lack of task 
consensus amongst the involved organizations. Lack of task consensus can be severe, over matters of 
principle, or less severe over matters of process (Molnar and Rogers, 1979). Brinkerhoff notes that in 
unitary, hierarchical contexts, conflict resulting from lack of task consensus can be resolved through 
command and control management styles. The dominant organization sets the objective and portions 
out the tasks to the supporting organizations. However, in federated and coalitional contexts there is 
no dominant organization to impose task consensus from the top-down, rather it must be built from the 
bottom-up. Such consensus-building processes take time, money and effort. This alone can be a 
problem in the developing world where resource scarcity is prevalent. Furthermore, consensus-
building across different cultures, education levels, and between interest-groups is even more laborious. 
Recognizing this situation will be important in terms of this study. 
Finally, Brinkerhoff (1996) states that conflicting vertical and horizontal requirements can be 
major threats to laRs. With reference to this point it is necessary to recognize that organizations, 
especially governmental ones, are never, sometimes despite their best etforts, completely operationally 
autonomous. On a conceptual level, Brinkerhoff (1996) states that vertical requirements are actions 
that an organization must do because of the hierarchy to which it belongs.. Hierarchy here does not 
only mean an explicit and acknowledged power structure in which organizations are arranged in some 
pyramidal fashion. It can also simply arise because power is not equally distributed between all 
involved entities. Horizontal requirements, on the other hand, are those actions that an organization 
needs to do in order to meet its operational goals. laRs are usually in this category. 
Unfortunately, these two sets of requirements can conflict with each other. In the development 
arena this conflict can occur quite regularly in that a funder's requirements often restrict the ability of a 
funded organization to carry out their objectives as they see fit. At times this may be an obstacle to 
laRs in that funders seldom give funded organizations an incentive, or a disincentive, to work with 
other organizations and timelines imposed by funding agencies may preclude otherwise possible 
interorganizational coordination. 
The above typology provides a list of possible challenges that this study will need to consider 
when analyzing its particular case study. 
with administration. 











3.5 Administration and its Cultural Underpinnings 
It was said earlier that there has been a strong trend in the West away from command and 
control, authoritarian, management structures to more egalitarian, bottom-up, so-called "flat" 
management structures (Chisholm, 1989). While this is true, it is important to note that this trend has 
been largely confined to the western developed world. In developing countries egalitarian sentiments 
in administration and management practice are rarely the norm (Brinkerhoff, 1996; Siffin, 1976)). 
Instead, strict hierarchy remains the dominant paradigm. Attempts to introduce different management 
structures based upon more egalitarian principles have generally been meet with confusion and 
skepticism. 
Despite colonialism's demise over 50 years ago, egalitarian cultures, still remain immature 
throughout most of the developing world. Even the simple meaning of a term such as 'coordination' 
can be a source of confusion when employed in strictly hierarchal cultures. While in an egalitarian 
culture coordination usually implies communication, in non-egalitarian cultures it more often means 
control (Brinkerhoff 1996). 
Couple this lack of understanding to the unsavory history of western exploitation in developing 
countries and it is not hard to see why a healthy amount of skepticism towards western attempts to 
change local administrative and management structures is widespread. Academics, however, have 
long noted the failure of development agencies to recognize the western cultural roots of the systems 
that they are promoting (Siffin, 1976). In other words, they have seen no reason why models and 
approaches that work in the USA and Germany may not work in Malawi or Papua New Guinea. The 
consequence of this cultural unsophistication is that western administrative proponents have been blind 
to the larger political and ethical consequences that may follow if their administrative systems are 
replicated in developing countries (Adams 1992). 
Local leaders in developing countries, however, have rarely been unaware of these 
consequences and are almost unanimously opposed to any change in management or administrative 
structure that will modify the power relations by which they govern. This problem has been well 
documented in the academic literature that examines early attempts at installing western technically 
rational administrative systems in developing countries (Siffin, 1976; Adams, 1992; Korten, 1987). 
Although the authors disagree on whom to blame, there is almost unanimous agreement that such 
efforts failed largely for cultural reasons (Najjar, 1974). 
However, the recent wave of more adaptive and less hierarchal management structures such as 











not been as harshly condemned. Indeed part of the impetus for these newer management systems has 
been the very recognition that those management systems were ill-suited to a developing world context 
(Korten 1987). However, there is still little evidence that rCM or other CBM eff0l1s have been any 
more successful then their predecessors at narrowing the "culture gap" between the developing world 
and the west. Although not its primary aim, this study may be able to contribute some insights here. 
For now it is simply important to note that if ICM is unable to narrow or bridge this gap, it is almost 
certain that cross-cultural coordination, which is inevitably necessary in the developing world, will be 
exceedingly difficult. In terms of understanding possible challenges to interorganizational 
coordination, this is a very important point to recognize. Culture is critical in determining the character 
and effectiveness of managerial systems and so long as the management systems that are promoted in 
the developing world continue to be formulated by western academics and practitioners it may be naive 
to assume that they will ever be either understood or welcomed by societies with different cultural 
backgrounds (Milne, 1970). 
3.6 Review 
Figure 3 
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ICM theory calls for a rather specific kind interorganizational coordination in order for its 
coastal management initiatives to be effective. This review of a collection of work on lOR theory has 
revealed a series of challenges that may be encountered by ICM practitioners seeking to promote this 
"ICM style" of interorganizational coordination in the developing world. The key ideas that have 
emerged from this review of lOR theory are briefly summarized. First, Honadle and Cooper (1989) 
provided a useful definition of coordination from organizational theory that has relevance for ICM. 
Second, Warren's (1967) work provided a contextual typology that suggested that such lCM style 
coordination could only occur within specific structural contexts. Therefore attempting to have [CM 
style coordination in unaccommodating structural contexts may be a major challenge. Third, 
Matland (1995) proposes that even those structural contexts are largely determined by underlying 
policy contexts. This suggests that lCM policies must be conducive to creating structural contexts in 
which ICM style coordination can take place. If they are not, there may be challenges ahead. 
Fourth, Brinkhoffs typology categorized the conflicts or challenges that are liable to happen in IORs 
generally. A key issue highlighted by Brinkhoff as well as many other lOR theorists, was that 
organizations instinctively seek to limit IORs because they are seen as a threat to operational autonomy. 
Second, he stated that lack of task consensus amongst organizations often cripples effective IORs. 
Finally, Brinkerhoff (1997) showed that competing and conflicting vertical and horizontal requirements 
often hindered IORs. leM style coordination may be susceptible to all of these challenges. Finally, 
this review of IORs looked at the issues surrounding the impact of culture on administration and cross-
cultural communication in terms of the challenges it may present to lCM style coordination in the 
developing world. This above list of challenges to interorganizational coordination will provide the 
basis for the discussion of the case study investigated. 
The following chapter will review the literature which discusses the history of coastal 
management in East Africa generally, Madagascar specifically, and then most specifically in the Tulear 
region of that country in which the case study is located. 
4. Review of IeM in the East African Region, Madagascar and the Tulear Region 
4.1 ICM in East Afi'ica 
For the purposes of this study, the history of relevant coastal management practice in East 











most eastern African nations including South Africa and Madagascar. Held under the auspices of the 
United Nations Environment Program's Regional Seas Program, the discussions at this conference 
culminated in the formulation of an East African Action Plan. This plan had a series of ambitious 
marine conservation and development goals. Unfortunately its implementation was greatly hindered 
by the failure of signatory countries to implement their financial commitments (Verlaan, 1996). 
Nevertheless the Nairobi Conference has served as an important reference point for subsequent marine 
and coastal management efforts. 
Following this, the "Rio Earth Summit" and the subsequent development of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) was held in 1992. As previously mentioned, it was at this sllmmit that 
ICM became internationally accepted as the "normative coastal development model" (Bille & Mermet 
2002). The Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity that emanated from this 
convention has served as the guiding document for international efforts to conserve the planet's marine 
and coastal ecosystems. The first, second, and third themes of the Jakarta Mandate foclls on 
recommendations to improve and promote ICM, Marine Protected Areas, and the sustainable use of 
coastal and marine resources (Goote 1997). Signatories to this Mandate commit themselves to 
implementing the recommendations in it and to reporting their progress to the CBD on a regular basis. 
Madagascar is one of those signatories. 
In the following year the Arusha Workshop and Conference on Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management in Eastern Africa, including the Island States was held Tanzania in April of 1993. This 
workshop was well attended by most East African nations including Madagascar and it is here that the 
educational process of introducing ICM policies to the East African region began. The major product 
of all this capacity building was a series of national level ICM plans. This workshop also called on 
scientists from all over the world to begin collecting the necessary data needed for such plans 
(Contracting, 2001). 
Following this, a further conference of East African nations was held in 1996 in the Seychelles 
which assessed the progress of ICM implementation in the region since the Arusha conference. 
Following this conference it was decided that a regional organization was needed in East Africa in 
order to promote and coordinate national level rCM efforts. Ten countries signed up to form this 
organization, including Madagascar. Entitled SEACAM (Secretariat for Eastern African Coastal Area 
Management) this organization has been responsible for sponsoring a variety of training and 
coordinating workshops since 1997 including one in Madagascar in 1999 that focused on the potential 











the Convention on Biological Diversity made by the Contracting Parties of the Nairobi Convention on 
Eastern African progress towards meeting the goals of the Jakarta Mandate stated that ICM plans and 
strategies were largely in place and that the focus now needed to be on implementation (Wells 200 I). 
Finally, one of the most recent conferences with regional significance was the 5th World Parks 
Congress held in Durban South Africa in 2003. Marine conservation was a major topic of discussion 
at this conference and ultimately resulted in the Malagasy president proclaiming his so-called "Durban 
Vision." Among other things this document commits Madagascar to placing 10% of its coastal and 
marine areas under formal protection by 2008 (MAP 2003). 
Even this short overview of coastal management related activities in the East African Region 
indicates that there has been a widespread and long-standing recognition of the importance of sound 
marine and coastal management. Besides the multiplicity of regional conferences and workshops, 
numerous associations have also been formed by various parties in order to promote effective coastal 
and marine management in the East African region and the island states. SEACAM has already been 
mentioned but there are a host of others. The Western Indian Ocean Fisheries Sub-Commission, the 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission's Regional Committee for the Cooperative 
Investigation of the North and Central Western Indian Ocean (IOCINCWIO), the Marine Science 
Program supported by SAREC, and the Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA) 
are also all active in the region. 
However, what is also clear from the literature is that despite the establishment of these policies, 
projects, and organizations promoting ICM, the capacity for implementing effective ICM programs in 
most East African nations still remains low. A review of individual country assessments in a 200 I 
report to the CBO showed that most East African countries still exhibit both a lack of ICZM programs 











.f. 2 ICM in Madagascar 
Figure 4 
Madagascar is no exception to the above judgement. The same 200 I report to the CBO stated 
that Madagascar had "insufficient capacity for managing ICZM programs" and a "critical lack of 
human capacity ... to develop and manage MPAs." To understand this we need to take a detailed look at 
Madagascar's coastal management history. 
To begin, it is important to note the importance of fisheries to the Malagasy economy. As of 
200 I, shrimp fishing alone was Madagascar's 3rd largest export earner (Contracting, 200 I) while over 
the past 20 years the number of fishers has doubled (Bille & Mermet 2002). Most of this increase is 
attributable to two factors. First, the natural population growth rate is relatively high at 3.2% per year. 
Lack of education and a natural inclination amongst fishers to pass down their trade ensures that fishing 
activities will continue to increase. Second, because inland areas are becoming increasingly degraded 
due to heavy deforestation, many Malagasy are moving to the coasts in order to find alternative 
livelihoods, usually as small-scale fishers or in some fishing related industry such as boat building, fish 
trading, or transportation. Therefore, although large-scale commercial fishing is a major component 
of Madagascar's total fisheries production it is also important to note that increasingly many of those 
who are putting pressure on Madagascar's coasts are small-scale artisanal fishers who have little 











world, has presented major challenges to environmental managers. 
In general, in order to meet these challenges the Malagasy government in consultation with the 
World Bank and several other international donors, developed a National Environmental Action Plan 
(NEAP) to guide its environmental management efforts in 1989 (Razafindralambo & Gaylord 200?). 
Implemented in 1990, it was originally envisioned to be comprised of three five-year phases. 
However in practice, for a variety of reasons, these five year phases have been extended to seven or 
eight years. Phase One ran from 1990 to approximately 1996 while Phase Two ran from 1996 until 
approximately 2003 or 2004 and Phase Three only commenced in 2006. In general terms, each phase 
was envisioned to introduce and implement principles of sustainable environmental management, first 
at the national level during Phase One, at the regional level during Phase Two and finally at the local 
level during Phase Three (Lindemann 2004). 
A coastal management component to the NEAP was introduced in Phase Two and is supposed 
to be expanded upon in Phase Three. This component, known as the EMC (Marine and Coastal 
Environment), is supposed to act as a cross-sectoral coordinating organization that tacilitates and 
promotes ICM at all levels of the government. At its inception it focused its work in two pilot areas in 
the Northeast and Southwest regions of Madagascar. Besides the NEAP, Madagascar does not have 
any specific piece of legislation mandating and giving regulatory support to ICM management 
principles. However it did enact in 2002 a "Policy for sustainable development of coastal and marine 
zones"(PSDMCZ). With the NEAP, this policy statement has served as the main legal framework 
through which ICM initiatives have been attempted. Additionally, there are several laws which 
although not explicitly connected to the PSDMCZ, may support its goals. 
The first of these is the so-called GELSOE, (Gestion Locale Securisee) law (No. 96025) 
enacted in 1996. It empowers local communities to manage their natural resources through a system of 
traditional customary law known as "Dina." If enacted through the proper channels these "Dina" are, 
at least theoretically, enforceable legal documents, which the communities themselves have executive 
power over. This law potentially gives a legal avenue for implementing the ICM principle of co-
management or community-based management. 
Furthermore Law, 93-022 contains a series of fisheries related regulations. There are size 
restrictions on many marine species, permits mandated for certain activities, the harvesting of certain 
species is restricted to specific 'seasons' while other marine species, including all sea turtles and marine 











law allows marine protect areas to be established by decree of the responsible authority of an area. 
The Malagasy National Protected Areas Management Association (ANGAP) has drafted a law, the 
Code des Aires Protegees (COAP), which wil\ provide regulations for these protected areas. 
Final\y, following the highly contested election of Marc Ravalomanana as President of 
Madagascar in 2002, the government produced a new vision statement called the Madagascar Action 
Plan (MAP). Its environmental component recommitted the Malagasy government to developing its 
environmental resources in a "sustainable" manner and reaffirmed its commitment to the "Durban 
Vision" by increasing the number and size of protected areas to include 10% of its national coastal zone 
(MAP 2003). However, the manner in which the MAP and the older NEAP will interact in the future 
is unclear. Though certainly not a replacement of the NEAP, which has secure international funding and 
is continuing its efforts in its Phase Three, the MAP is envisioned to be the dominant vision statement 
for Malagasy national development in all sectors, including the environment. The NEAP was 
developed under the old socialist regime of Ratsiraka and the new government under Marc 
Ravolomana is quite open about its desire to correct the perceived mistakes of the old regime. 
Beyond the government's efforts to establish laws and regulations for coastal management, 
international conservation organizations have also been active at the national level in capacity building 
workshops and have provided support, both financial and technical, to ICM related projects in 
Madagascar (Arico & Rakotoary 1997). In 1998, WWF and the UNESCO sponsored a workshop that 
considered four sites as potential marine biosphere reserves. In 1999, WWF sponsored a workshop 
that aimed at assisting the coastal management component of the NEAP to promote MPA creation as an 
effective strategy towards more sustainable ICM-style coastal management. The Indian Ocean 
Commission (I0C) sponsored a program that aimed at setting up a national network to monitor the 
health of Madagascar's coral reefs at five different sights around the country. And finally, The 
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) has been active in promoting MPA initiatives especially in the 
Masola Penninsula in Northeast Madagascar (Andrianarivo, date unknown). 
The results of all of these projects cannot be easily summarized or collectively judged, however 
the statements at the beginning of this overview of Madagascar's national level coastal management 
efforts bears repeating, namely that despite all of the above efforts, Madagascar has a "critical lack of 
human capacity" for coastal management (Contracting, 200 I). Furthermore, often there is either "no 
enforcement" (Resolution 1993) of the above laws or it is "extremely scarce whereas violation of the 











-1.3 leM in the Soufh11'est Tzt/ear Region of Madagascar 
The Southwest region of Madagascar is both the poorest region in Madagascar and the most 
heavily fished. Most villagers outside the regional capital survive on more or less a dollar day 
(Development 2002). Nearly 50% of all Malagasy fishers live and fish in the coastal waters of this 
region (Laroche 1995). Most of the fishing is artisanal and conducted through non-intensive, non-
technical, means. The only international exporter of fish products active in the region is a French-
owned company, Copefrito, based out of the regional capital, Tulear. It is a major buyer of coastal 
products, mostly octopus, from artisanal fishers along the coast and once was a large supplier of fishing 
materials to these communities (pers comm.). 
The ecological health of the coasts in the Southwest region varies from fairly pristine to heavily 
degraded (Ranaivoson 1998). The Grand Recif, a large coral reef which lies in the coastal waters just 
outside of the regional capital of Tulear suffers from most of the problems typical of this region. It is 
overfished, polluted by a city of 300,000 people which is completely devoid of any waste water 
sanitation system, has high sediment levels due to a variety of human induced activities, and has 
suffered high levels of bleaching for reasons that are less clear but thought to be tied to increasing sea 
temperatures (Guibert; Salm et al. 1998). 
In terms of the academic coastal management literature interested in this area there are only a 
few author's works that are relevant to the study and will be reviewed. Of most relevance are the 
studies undertaken by two Frenchmen, Rapheal Bille and Laurent Mermet. These researchers studied 
the southwestern pilot project of the previously mentioned coastal and marine component (EMC) of the 
second phase of the Madagascar's NEAP. In two articles, both published in 2002, the authors came to 
some interesting conclusions. To summarize their findings, they found that the EMC was largely 
incapable of achieving its mandate to be a facilitator and promoter of IeM in the Southwest region. 
Based in the regional capital ofTulear, it suffered from lack of funding and resources, lack of authority 
and hierarchal standing amongst the organizations it was supposed to coordinate, lack of educational 
and institutional capacity, and from political and social contexts that were not sympathetic to its 
actions. Instead of serving as a coordinator for the previously existing coastal management 
institutions and resource user groups it became 'sectoralized' into simply another promoter of an 
amorphously understood environmental agenda. However, in one of its few success stories the EMC 
was able to support the creation of a community-run marine reserve some 20km south of Tulear 
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Rakotoson and Tanner, studied the development of a marine resource user's association in Mangily, a 
coastal village in Ranobe Bay. Similar to the previously mentioned community based-association set 
up by the EMC in Anakao, the association in Mangily, called FIMIMIRA (roughly translated as the 
Association for the Protection of Big Water) was formed to act as a local management authority. 
However, in their assessment of the association the authors stated that it was "crippled by the strong 
involvement of the hotel owners in comparison to the weak involvement of villagers in the process." 
Furthermore, the authors stated that because villagers did not feel that their interests were represented 
sufficiently in the decisions of the association they were uncooperative in enforcing the local "Dina" 
formulated by it. Attempts by FIMIMIRA to curb illegal and destructive fishing practices and to 
establish marine protected areas were seen by villagers to be just another attempt by foreign hands to 
limit their access to natural resources which, in their minds, they were fully within their rights to 
exploit. The authors recommended that if FIMIMIRA was to become an effective and truly 
representative local management authority in Ranobe Bay then the villagers must be empowered to 
playa more influential role in its operations. More about this association and its efforts will be 
discussed later from this study's own research as F[MIMIRA's creation was in many ways a precursor 
to this report's case study. However, beyond this single article no published academic work has been 
undertaken on coastal management issues in the Bay of Ranobe. Accordingly, the description of the 
case study provided below has been written almost entirely from this author's own findings. 
4.5 Coastal Management History in the Case Study Area 
Ranobe Bay located at 23°00'S 43°30'E, 23° 18'S and 43°38'E, begins approximately 20 
kilometers north of Tulear (refer map). It is largely enclosed by a 32 kilometer long reef that at its 
furthest point is around 6 kilometers from the coast. Almost no point inside the bay is deeper than 20 
meters and the average depth is between 5 and 10 meters. Coral outcroppings, extensive sea grass beds 
near the coastline, and expansive sandy floors are the dominant topographical features. The bay is 
populated predominantly by the Yezo people. They are almost entirely fishers, the name "vezo" 
means "to paddle" in the local dialect, and in the not so distant past they were a nomadic people. 
However in the past 1 00 years most have settled themselves into around 18 villages on the shores of 
Ranobe Bay (Astuti, 1995). The majority of these villages have 1000 inhabitants or less while the three 
largest villages, Ifaty, Mangily, and Manombo all have more or less 3000 inhabitants. [n addition to the 











clustered around Mangily and to a lesser extent around Ifaty 
The socio-economic and governance situation in the bay is very poor. There are no 
government offices of any kind in the bay area, no police stations, no equipped medical facilities, and 
no access to electricity except through expensive private generators, nor any sanitation or waste 
disposal systems. The 30 kilometer journey from Mangily to Tulear takes approximately two hours 
because of poor road conditions and during the rainy season is often entirely impassable. Most 
villagers live on approximately one US dollar a day. Their fishing is almost entirely artisanal. 
Dugout canoes, home-made nets, harpoons, lines, the occasional spear gun and diving mask are the 
fishing equipment employed. Most of the fish is sold either to the hotels, sent to Tulear, sold within 
the villages themselves, with the reminder being consumed directly by the fisher's families. As far as 
can be ascertained, yields are generally small, less than 10 kilograms per day, but vary erratically 
depending upon the time of year, and the luck or skill of the fisher (Razafimandimby 2006). 
The ecological conditions in Ranobe Bay are no less dire. Most scientific and local authorities 
familiar with the bay agree that the biological productivity of the bay has been declining at least for the 
last 20 years. The reasons for this decline are fairly well understood although their relative 
importance is less clear. First, two rivers bring high levels of sedimentation into the bay. This 
sediment comes from inland deforestation and ecologically insensitive agricultural practices. 
Sedimentation damages the marine ecosystems in the bay by smothering corals and changing the 
chemical composition of the seawater. Second, overfishing and ecologically destructive fishing 
practices have had serious impacts. Fishers regularly walk on the reef flats searching for octopus or 
other marine life, smash coral outcroppings in order to scare fish into the open ocean, and practice 
beach seining in the seagrass beds. Third, human waste pollution from the local villages and hotels 
may also be impacting the bay. The population has been, and is continuing to increase rapidly in 
Ranobe Bay. The village of Mangily alone has grown from a mere 200 inhabitants 15 years ago to 
more than 3000 today. Finally massive coral bleaching occurred in the bay around 2002. It is thought 
that the high sedimentation levels and the heavy fishing pressure have contributed to the slow recovery 











lIhp of T\ll~~l R~gIOll 
\Jn lorlun~lely, gov~rnmem o11d in ternationa l organifalion activi ty (0 deal wilh the,e coastal 
management i >s\IC~ in [{aDobe Gay has occn and continues 10 he yuile limited. Governmellt li,herie, 
and coa~la l manogemenl agcncics ho\c li ltle capocity for mOllitoring, regu lating or policing a~(ivili e~ ill 
the bay. SAGE (Se rvice cI 'Appuj fa Ge,liolL de l'Environmcnt). a gO\'emment agerwy laL"~cly funded 
through 1'1'3 ol1d conccrncU with rura l and environmental devei(}pment, has had ,;poradic contact with 
Ihe vi llage 'Iokontany' ma)'(}1'; lAM1Cemillg Ii'h ing regula tions but its limited I .... e>ell~ e ha~ C<Mlslra incU 
its inlluence. The previousl)' melltionL-d IIISM ha, all un~tafl"ed 'research >latioll'ju,t north of If my, 
lhat ill rcality is nothing: more than a 30 ycar old concrete huildillg "ith no scientific faci litie>, 
decll'icilY, or eVCn plumbing Various larger jrllemational ~COs ~lIch 0> the Wi ldl ife Conscrvation 











collaboration with larger regional marine conservation initiatives such as the previously mentioned 
Marine Biosphere project, have earmarked certain areas in the bay as good candidates for a coastal 
management project but none of these initiatives have any current status within the bay. 
Only one small foreign NGO, ReefDoctor, has had any permanent presence in the Bay. It 
became established in Ifaty in 200 I, and since then has implemented various marine conservation 
projects including those concerned with coral reef restoration, community management, and 
environmental education, primarily in the village of Ifaty. One of the main achievements of this NGO 
has been to support the creation of a marine resource users association for the entire Ranobe Bay area. 
This association was established in late 2006 and entitled FIMIHARA (Fikambanana Miaro sy Hanasoa 
ny Ranomasina, roughly translated as the Association to Protect and Enhance the Marine 
Environment). In many ways it is the successor to the previously discussed FIMIMIRA in Mangily 
(pers comm.). Representatives from all the villages in the Ranobe area, hotel owners, and all scuba 
diving shop owners have been invited to join the association. Various office bearers, including village 
presidents, were elected and "Dina" created. The association is legally recognized and empowered to 
regulate coastal and marine activities in the Bay although the government has not provided any 
financial support to the association for this management. In practice, few hotel owners or dive shops 
owners, with a couple exceptions, have taken any active role in the association's activities. Following 
the association's establishment, ReefDoctor supported FIMIHARA in creating a small marine protected 
area within Ranobe Bay entitled the "Massif de Roses" or in English the "Rose Garden". Although 
only 400 square meters in extent, and surrounding a large dominantly foliose coral outcropping, it is the 
first government recognized MPA ever established in Ranobe Bay. FIMIHARA employs a guardian 
to protect the site daily and to collect tickets costing approximately one US dollar from any tourists 
interested in snorkeling or diving in the reserve. The hotels, and to a lesser extent the pirogue-owners, 
who organize the tours to the Rose Garden, have largely recognized the authority of FIMIHARA and 
comply with paying the entrance fee. Nevertheless, the project has encountered some problems. The 
ticket collection process has run into a fair measure of non-compliance and issues concerning the 
guardian have been numerous. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the findings section of 
this dissertation. Nevertheless, the Rose Garden has been largely successful in so far as it is making 
money for the association, and is therefore economically sustainable, and to the extent that some 
observers familiar with the site and its history, have seen at least an anecdotal improvement in level of 
fish diversity and abundance within the MPA. Most recently, ReetDoctor has been successful in 











coastal management and development related activities in Ranobe Bay. 
4.6 The Case Study 
The coastal management project that has served as the case study for this dissertation began its 
formulation process in early 2007. Entitled the "Toliara Land and Seascape Conservation Program for 
the Ranobe Complex and Lower Onilahy River Valley and Delta" the proposal was written by WWF 
Madagascar and submitted to WWF Sweden and Norway as potential funders. Very broadly this 
program seeks to "initiate implementation of a long-term vision and planning(sic) for the conservation 
of these unique landscapes[Ranobe and Oni lahy] that includes catalyzing important regional programs 
for addressing the macro-economic root causes for biodiversity loss and a related increase in rural 
poverty."(Proposal, 2007) The research for this study has focused solely on the "Ranobe Complex" 
portion of this WWF project and will henceforth, for the sake of simplicity, be called the "Ranobe 
Project". In the proposal for this marine conservation project, there are a series of time specific plans. 
The first outlines very generally what it hopes the project will achieve in fifteen years, then in five 
years, and then in three years. In terms of marine conservation in Ranobe Bay the proposal outlines a 
series of objectives ranging from completing coastal environmental management plans (CEMPs), to 
conducting educational workshops, to completing marine surveys of the bay. All of these efforts are 
focused around promoting the creation of marine protected areas in Ranobe Bay. Indeed, the proposal 
states that the first expected result from the first year of activities is having obtained "Temporary 
Protected Area status for the Ranobe Complex ... " In order to implement these objectives in the bay the 












Figure 7 Stakeholders in the Ranobe Project 
WWF 
Madagascal 
The chief partner named in terms of the Ranobe Bay portion of the project is the NGO, ReefDoctor. 
Although not explicitly stated in the proposal, discussions with the proposal writer suggest that 
ReetDoctor is the "lead" project implementer with WWF providing a supporting and supervisory role. 
4.7 Ranobe Project Formulation and Implementation Process 
The following brief overview of the Ranobe Project will cover a time period of roughly one 
year from early 2007 until early 2008. This year can be divided into two parts. From early 2007 
until approximately June of the same year, the proposal for the initial funding of the project was being 
formulated by WWF Tulear and was submitted to WWF Sweden and Norway. Following that from 
July 2007 until early 2008, the project was in the early stages of implementation. According to the 
proposal writer, the impetus for the formulation the WWF Ranobe project came from a variety of 
sources. First, it was responding to the increasing international call for more MPAs worldwide and 
the writer knew of a donor, namely WWF Sweden, that was interested in supporting a marine 
conservation initiative and which had extra funds to allocate to such a project. Second, WWF 
Madagascar had two terrestrial-based projects nearly adjacent to Ranobe Bay that were running out of 
funding. Third, the proposal writer had a personal interest in starting a community managed marine 
protected area south of Tulear (in the Onilahy Delta) and knew that ReefDoctor had recently had, in his 
opinion, some success in Ranobe Bay by establishing a community-based fisher's association, 











initiatives into a "land and seascape" project seemed to be an ideal solution. The proposal was 
submitted to WWF Sweden in June and a representative from Sweden was sent to Madagascar shortly 
thereafter in order to obtain first-hand knowledge of the situation. ReefDoctor and the Tulear Office 
of WWF Madagascar met with this representative and ultimately the proposal for the Ranobe Project 
was approved. It is important to note that although ReefDoctor, at least from the viewpoint of the 
proposal writer, is the lead implementer of the Ranobe Project, all of the funding from WWF Sweden 
and Norway will be given to WWF Madagascar who will then allocate it during project implementation 
as they see fit. Why this arrangement has occurred and its consequences will be discussed in depth in 
the following sections of the dissertation. 
Figure 8 Ranobe Project Timeline 
E'-lily 2007 E.uly 2008 
ReefOoctol submits IHol'os<11 
WWF TlIle,u tlsks ReefOoctor to submit ploposal 
July 2007. IHOI)Os.ll is accepted. Project Implemention Begins 
WWF Sweden visits WWF Tuleal to assess 1>101)05,11 
Eally 2007. fOlmulation of R.lllohe Ploject ploposal begins. 
The Ranobe Project's implementation phase started in approximately July of 2007. At this 
time, WWF Madagascar requested that ReetDoctor submit a budget proposal to them in order to carry 
out two of the objectives outlined in the Ranobe Project proposal. The first objective was to conduct 
scientific baseline marine surveys on coral reefs in several areas proposed as likely candidates for MPA 
status. The second objective was to capacitate villages by sending representatives from villages 
surrounding Ranobe Bay on several 'study trips' to another coastal village in the north which already 
had an established community marine conservation program sponsored by the Wildlife Conservation 
Society (WCS) and Blue Ventures, another small foreign marine conservation NGO. This study trip 
was envisioned as a capacity building exercise, and the expectation was that villagers from Ranobe Bay 
would learn and be inspired by the experiences of this community-run marine conservation program. 











budget has been a protracted affair. The proposal has undergone several iterations. There are several 
reasons for this. First, a new marine program coordinator at WWF's Tulear office was employed in 
December 2007 and had to be 'brought up to speed' on the details of ReefDoctor's proposal. Second, 
WWF's head office in the capital of Antananarivo was dissatisfied with the proposal and requested that 
it be revised. Furthermore, ReefDoctor's own head Scientific Officer completed his contract at the 
end of January 2008 and a new Head Science Officer had not been appointed by mid-February. 
Because of this, although it was originally envisioned that the study trips and collection of survey data 
would both be completed before the end of 2007, neither objective was completed even at the end this 
dissertation's research period in mid February of 2008. In addition, Reef Doctor's proposal writer and 
chief negotiator with WWF in Tulear left Madagascar in February 2008 with a plan to return after a 
couple of months. 
Before presenting the findings of this study, it is important to note what is missing in the above 
description and timeline of the Ranobe Project. First, counter to leM's prescriptions, the Ranobe 
Project's proposal formulation phase was not participatory, nor was there any stakeholder consultation 
in its formulation. Furthermore beyond the Ranobe Project proposal, no further implementation-
guiding document for the entire project has been formulated and there are no future plans to devise 
such a document in a participatory manner or otherwise. The reasons for these omissions and their 
consequences will be discussed in detail below. 
5. Findings 
As stated in the Introduction to this dissertation, the research was conducted in order to learn 
about the issues relating to the character of interorganizational coordination that occurred, or did not 
occur, during the formulation and early implementation of the Ranobe Project. It should be stressed 
here again, that this study was not conducted in order to evaluate the 'success' or 'failure' of the project 
and its implementation in terms of the degree to which there was coordination, or not, as judged by 
some set of 'best practice' criteria. The author formulated no such criteria and an evaluation of this 
project, at this an early stage in its implementation, would be severely premature. The quality of the 
interorganizational coordination that has occurred to date in the Ranobe Project, although relevant to 
this research, was not its focus. Rather, the research aimed at providing data about the contexts, 
institutions, stakeholders, and the dynamics between the relevant entities, which were involved in 











occurred to date in the Ranobe Project. This enhanced understanding of IORs occurring 111 the 
Ranobe Project was largely informed by a review of the relevant literature, participant observations as 
well as in-depth interviews with key informants. With this data, the author hoped to discover whether 
or not the lOR literature could contribute to an improved understanding regarding the 
interorganizational relations that occur in ICM initiatives, such as the Ranobe Project. 
However, as stated in the Introduction, this research process was significantly guided by the 
author's knowledge of lOR theory. Accordingly, the findings will be related thematically around 
issues that the lOR literature states are critical to understanding how interorganizational coordination 
networks function. 
First, the findings will focus on the issues of communication and participation that arose in the 
Ranobe Project. Second, the issues of capacity in all of its various forms and levels are examined. 
Third, the issue of trust that arose amongst the involved organizations is discussed. Fourth, the issues 
surrounding the goals and expectations held by each organization in relation to the Ranobe Project are 
discussed. Finally, the importance of individuals, versus organizations or institutions, in the 
interorganizational coordination network that existed in the Ranobe Project, are explored and 
discussed. 
5.1 Key Issues 
5.1.l Communication and Participation 
The first step in any coordination effort is communication and making sure that everyone who 
should be involved is involved, in other words that there is an appropriate level of participation. ICM 
theory calls for a diverse set of stakeholders to be involved in the formulation and implementation of 
any coastal management project. However, this clearly did not happen in the formulation or early 
implementation of the Ranobe project. Based on the research it is evident that the level of 
interorganizational coordination was very limited. The proposal writer, a veteran of numerous 
conservation efforts in Madagascar for nearly twenty years, was able, based upon his intimate 
knowledge of the country, to almost single-handedly develop the vision and objectives of the proposal. 
Neither local leaders within Ranobe Bay, government officials, nor local research institutions such as 
the IHSM, or even ReetDoctor were consulted. Only once the proposal had been submitted did some 











ReefDoctor to prepare some presentations to show the representative from WWF Sweden. Following 
that, as already stated, the coordination between RcefDoctor and WWF Madagascar continued in the 
form of a protracted process in which ReetDoctor was asked to submit a funding and project proposal 
and budget for certain aspects of the Ranobe Project. 
There are many possible reasons for this limited coordination, some of which are clear as they 
were stated explicitly in interviews conducted during the research process and others of which are more 
speculative. First, information gleaned from an interview with the writer of the proposal indicated 
that in his opinion such broad-based participation at the formulation stage was simply unnecessary or 
perhaps premature. Additionally, the funds from WWF Sweden may have been time-sensitive (pers. 
communication), so even if the proposal writer had desired to have a lengthy participatory proposal 
formulation process, the need to secure funding proved paramount. Nevel1heless, it should be stated 
that the writer of the proposal and the proposal itself stress the importance of broad-based participation 
during project implementation (Proposal 2007). 
Interviews conducted with key stakeholders in the Ranobe Project indicate that at least in its 
early stages, participation was not occurring. Following the proposal's acceptance, no further guiding 
project document was formulated. Instead, the project's implementors, at this time only ReefDoctor 
and WWF Madagascar, simply used the proposal's own schedule and objectives to guide their actions. 
By February 2008, interviews conducted with representatives from FIMIHARA, the IHSM and the 
Director of Rural Development for the Southwest Region, showed that none of them had any 
knowledge of the WWF Ranobe Project's existence, let alone its objectives. Here, the constraints to 
the level of interorganizational coordination may have been of a more logistical and technical nature. 
For although the proposal clearly advocates a participatory process and all of the above parties 
interviewed clearly stated a desire for coordination, communication in southwest Madagascar is 
extremely difficult and rudimentary. Cell phone reception is limited and unreliable, the internet is 
slow and unreliable, roads are poor, electricity provision is unreliable, and even the postal service does 
not extend much beyond the regional capital. Furthermore, the high staff turnover in both WWF and 
ReefDoctor meant that much of the institutional information that had been gathered and circulated, was 
lost when employees left, and the process of getting the new employees "up to speed" takes time, 
delaying the possibility for coordinated action. 
Finally, the geographic distances between the organizations normatively involved in the WWF 
Ranobe project proved an obstacle to communication and hence possible coordination. The offices of 
WWF and all government agencies are in Tulear while FIMIHARA, ReefDoctor, the hoteliers, and dive 











any means of personal transport and public transport around the bay and to Tulear is infrequent and 
unreliable. Given this environment, it is not surprising that the nonnatively involved organizations, 
even with the best of intentions, struggled to simply understand and keep track of each other's 
activities, let alone coordinate those activities. 
5.1.2 Lack of Capacity and Resources 
In addition to the above technical challenges to coordination imposed on the implementers of 
the Ranobe Project, the organizations themselves often lack the institutional capacity to coordinate their 
activities. 
Financially none of the normatively involved organizations, with the possible exception of 
WWF, have the resources to fully communicate or coordinate their activities. Ultimately coordination 
and communication requires organizations to employ people in order to perform those functions and to 
provide them with the resources to do so effectively. However, neither ReefDoctor, FIMIHARA, nor 
any of the government agencies involved in the project have the budgets to competitively employ 
adequate statf and to equip that staff with vehicles, fuel, maintenance budgets, cell phones, a call credit 
allowance, office space, computers, and internet access. If for no other reason, this lack of capacity 
and resources makes it understandable that no members of FIMIHARA or government agencies were 
party to any of the negotiations and discussions during the early implementation stages of the WWF 
Ranobe project. 
In addition to a lack of financial resources for coordination efforts, most of the involved 
organizations also lack the financial means to carry out scientific work, both for the Ranobe Project and 
otherwise. As the head science officer of ReefDoctor pointed out, collaboration depends upon there 
being something to collaborate on. Yet if organizations are unable to perform their individual 
functions they cannot come to the 'coordinating table' with very much to offer. The IHSM lacks basic 
scientific laboratory equipment and testing facilities, has no scuba diving equipment, and usually lacks 
a fuel budget in order to utilize their boat. With only 10 percent of its budget supplied by the 
government, ninety percent of the IHSM's budget, and hence its work, depends on, and is guided by, 
the interests of the foreign collaborators that they can attract. 
ReefDoctor is in a slightly better position in this regard but they are still too small to finance 
much scientific work beyond the collection of basic survey data. To date they have no laboratory 











work but even they have no facilities or in-house expelts to carry out such scientitic work. 
Consequently, they too must contract out such services at high expense. 
However, even with better facilities and equipment it is doubtful that greater coordination could 
have been achieved. In addition to inadequate financial resources, most of the involved organizations 
also lacked qualified staff. Although WWF have a long history of terrestrial conservation in 
Madagascar, this organization has very little institutional experience in marine conservation. All of 
their current marine conservation initiatives in the country are less than five years old and the managers 
of those projects are equally inexperienced. 
The local government agencies have little experience in marine conservation and do not have 
the funds to hire outside consultants or fund local people to undergo foreign training. ReetDoctor is 
in a similar position. Although certainly the veteran marine conservation organization in terms of the 
Ranobe Project, it suffers from poor institutional continuity because its staff rarely stay beyond their 
initial one year contracts. Additionally its financial resources make it impossible to offer competitive 
salaries that would attract highly experienced and qualified employees. Local educational institutions, 
such as the IHSM, have some indigenous educational capacity. However, their critical lack of 
financial resources constrains their research capacity and hence the indigenous institutional knowledge 
that they can create and maintain. 
Finally, the members of FIMIHARA and its leadership, lack the education to undertake an ICM-
type program. The president and most of its members have had limited schooling of any kind, speak 
only their native Malagasy tongue, and have no access or ability to work with technology such as 
computers which are needed at the very least to write up proposals. In addition, they have limited 
understanding of policies, statutes, regulations and a host of other legal and formal documents integral 
to the effective functioning of any IeM project. The life-long poverty of its members means that 
institutionally FIMIHARA has little capacity for managing a budget or even opening a savings account 
without outside assistance. And even this outside assistance is severely limited. Academically trained 
coastal management experts with experience in Madagascar are rare, and even when opportunities 
arise, because of limited educational and institutional capacity, FIMIHARA on its own is incapable of 
recognizing and capitalizing upon those opportunities. 
Furthermore much of the indigenous knowledge and capacity that the local fishers do have is at 
odds with some of the most basic tenants of any (western) management system, ICM included. To 
give a few of the most obvious examples in the case of the Ranobe Project, the local Yezo culture in 
Ranobe Bay teaches that the Bay is normatively an open access resource. The very concept of 











capacity for production is inexhaustible, i.e. that there "\vill always be fish" (questionnaire response). 
And finally, the Yezo believe that not only is the beach the most appropriate place for human waste 
disposal, but that it is even taboo to defecate in any enclosed or purpose built structure such as a pit 
toilet. The strength with which this belief is held was demonstrated during the research process when 
a Yezo ReefDoctor staff member attempted to defecate in the front yard of the personal home of 
ReefDoctor's Director and refused to use the inside toilet even when offered it. Such indigenous beliefs 
and cultural practices heavily influence how the members of FIMIHARA, who are overwhelmingly 
Yezo, define that organization's purpose and should not be trivialized, dismissed in disbelief as bizarre, 
nor underestimated. More about the difficulties that this 'alternate' education made for the Ranobe 
Project, particularly in terms of administration, will be discussed later on. 
5.1.3 Lack of Trust 
In addition to difficulties with communication and capacity, the Ranobe Project also 
experienced difficulties in building interorganizational trust. This hampered every organization's 
ability to coordinate their activities with every other organization involved in the project. For the sake 
of brevity this study will only look at three of these relationships here. First it will discuss the issues 
of trust generally between the indigenous peoples of Ranobe Bay and foreign organizations involved in 
the Ranobe project. Second, the relationship between ReetDoctor and WWF Madagascar will be 
discllssed, and third the relationship between ReefDoctor and FlMIHARA will be discussed. 
The relationships between foreign organizations and indigenous organizations in Madagascar, 
as in much of the developing world, are complicated by the tragic history of colonization, and deep 
cultural differences that exist between the foreign and local stakeholders. These isslles surfaced in the 
Ranobe Project. The Yezo people of Ranobe Bay are by nature culturally traditional, independent-
minded, and wary of "outsiders." They are fiercely proud of their lifestyle and generally not 
interested in changing it. Fishing is not so much an occupation to the Yezo as a way of life (Astuti 
1995). The Yezo's experience of foreigners has generally been either through foreign academics 
coming to Ranobe Bay to do research, or foreign investors wishing to establish businesses such as 
hotels in the area. Neither activity is of much interest to the Yezo, except for the limited financial gain 
they might receive from selling them fish or by acting as local guides. To the Yezo, toreigners, 
although certainly capable of bringing resources into the Bay are, are seen to be at best hannlessly self-











Foreign organizations have responded to this skepticism in a variety of ways depending upon 
their interests. Although it is dangerous to generalize, foreign-owned hoteliers and dive centers in the 
Bay have tended to minimize their business and personal activities with the Yezo. The efforts at 
engagement that have occurred, such as the formation of FIMINANA (as opposed to FIMIHARA), 
have usually ended with great frustration and pessimism. Malagasy hotel employees are usually 
brought in from villages outside of Ranobe Bay as the Yezo are generally considered poor workers. 
With some exceptions, the hoteliers in Ranobe Bay are disinterested in engaging with the Yezo in some 
sort of co-management arrangement and some are even hostile to such efforts. In terms of the Ranobe 
project, none of those interviewed during the research had even heard of the project, but most 
expressed skepticism when told about it. 
ReefDoctor, on the other hand, has of course tried vigorously to persuade the Yezo that it is an 
organization dedicated to their education and development. In order to do this, it has found that 
engaging in social development projects such as sponsoring sporting activities, a women's association, 
and running a weekend 'kids club' have helped engender some good will amongst the Yezo. However, 
this research found that many still regard ReefDoctor, because of its known interest 111 marIne 
conservation, as a threat to their way of life. Furthermore, information gained from this study's 
survey of local villagers found that, despite ReefDoctor's six year presence in the Bay, many were still 
unaware of its very presence or able to state what it was doing in the Bay. 
In the case of the Ranobe Project, WWF Madagascar has responded to this general skepticism 
by relying on ReefDoctor to act as a link between themselves and the Yezo. Instead of building their 
own relationships with FIMIHARA and the Yezo of Ranobe Bay, WWF has for a variety reasons, 
found it more advantageous to capitalize on the pre-existing trust between ReetDoctor and the Yezo. 
In practice, this has had the consequence that the Yezo and FIMIHARA have little or no knowledge of, 
let alone trust in, WWF as a partner in the coastal management of Ranobe Bay. 
The dominant interorganizational relationship in the Ranobe project is that between WWF 
Madagascar and ReefDoctor. Both organizations stated repeatedly their commitment to 
interorganizational coordination. However, issues of trust from both organizations have slowed the 
ability of either organization to coordinate their activities. 
First, it is important to note that WWF Madagascar has several offices, each with its own 
institutional character. Its head office is in the capital, Antananarivo, and branch offices are scattered 
across the country, one of which is in Tulear. These branch offices are responsible for implementing 
projects in their region. However, their ability to allocate funding, particularly to outside 











Antananarivo. Therefore, organizations wishing to coordinate their actions with wwr Madagascar 
actually have to build relationships with WWF representatives in two locations. For small 
organizations like ReefDoctor, and even more so FIMIHARA, this can be a laborious exercise. 
Furthermore, according to its own employees, WWF Madagascar, because it is such a large and 
relatively well-funded organization, and for a variety of other reasons that will be discussed later, has a 
tendency to "go it alone" instead of working with local, and usually smaller, partner organizations. 
Finally, WWF Madagascar has recently had a poor experience working with a smaller NGO in the area 
on some terresital projects and so is cautious about working with another similar organization like 
ReefDoctor with whom at least WWF's head office has had little experience. 
ReefDoctor's engagement with WWF Madagascar, as well, has not been without reservations. 
ReefDoctor is almost entirely funded through a private trust and therefore has historically not relied 
upon grants or any other type of outside funding. The Ranobe Project is the first time in its six year 
history that it has attempted to collaborate with another organization on such a large scale. Moreover, 
the experiences of another small marine conservation NGO that has recently collaborated with a larger 
conservation NGO, with less than satisfactory results, has influenced ReefDoctor's outlook on its 
potential relationship with WWF. In particular, ReefDoctor is sensitive to ensuring that the 
collaboration between itself and WWF is conducted on a level playing field. It has done this by 
emphasizing that it is an organization with its own programs and projects and not a consultant to be 
hired by WWF in order to carry out WWF's project objectives. ReefDoctor's attitude is that trust, 
coordination, and operational flexibility will be eagerly given, but only as much as it is received. 
In practice, the above to attitudes to interorganizational coordination have resulted in a very 
slow implementation process. Nevertheless, it should be stated that both organizations are cautiously 
optimistic about the possibility for future collaborative efforts. 
Finally, issues of trust have heavily influenced the relationships between local government 
institutions, including the IHSM, and foreign organizations in the Ranobe project. 
First, all the foreign organizations involved in the Ranobe Project, WWF, ReefDoctor, and the 
foreign hoteliers agree that government institutions are woefully ill-equipped to perform their various 
functions and therefore can rarely be trusted to do them effectively. Moreover, beyond issues of 
capacity, perceived corruption further curtails the amount of trust foreign institutions put in government 
agencies. Nevertheless foreign organizations also recognize the necessity for working with local 
government agencies in terms of national capacity building and simply in order to be allowed to work 
within the country. Furthermore, foreign organizations have noted that in terms of mitigating the 











coordination with relevant government agencies. 
Government agencies on the other hand, were adamant that foreign organizations should not 
work with complete operational autonomy within their jurisdictions. Projects must be done in 
consultation with government agencies and in such a way that their own intuition's representatives are 
employed. All scientific researchers in the country are required to hire local collaborators and of 
course all projects that have any legal components, such as the Ranobe Project, must go through the 
proper government agencies. With foreign and local interorganizational collaboration legally mandated 
issues of trust are somewhat moot except to the extent that such collaboration often becomes superficial 
and formalistic. In the Ranobe Project although the proposal lists many government agencies as 
partner organizations, in reality and in practice none of them have had any influence on the activities 
occurring during the early stages of implementation. 
5.1.4 Divergent Objectives 
Finally after issues of communication, capacity, and trust, the presence of divergent 
intraorganizational objectives played an important role in shaping the character of the 
interorganizational relationships in the Ranobe Project. The involved organizations, depending upon 
a variety of contextual factors, developed different ideas of what the Ranobe Project should look like 
and what the project should work towards. The different objectives and institutional contexts that are 
informing their positions will now be discussed. 
First is the Ranobe Bay Project as envisioned by WWF Madagascar. In accordance with the 
Third Phase of the NEAP, the Durban Vision, and the MAP, WWF sees the Ranobe Project as a means 
of creating additional marine protected areas in Madagascar. As a wildlife conservation organization, 
WWF's primary raison d'entre for any of its projects is the preservation of the earth's ecosystems and 
especially those under threat due to human factors. In Madagascar, WWF believes MPAs are essential 
to conserving Madagascar's unique coastal biodiversity. Furthermore, WWF recognizes that in order 
for these MPAs to be effective, the local communities must manage them. This requires WWF to 
involve, capacitate, and empower local communities with the tools necessary for such management. 
In order to do this, WWF, in collaboration with ReefDoctor and another marine conservation NGO, 
Blue Ventures, is organizing the previously mentioned 'study trips' during which representatives from 
Ranobe Bay, largely from FIMIHARA, will visit a village further up the coast in order to learn about a 











ReefDoctor's goals for the Ranobe Project on the other hand, although not necessarily In 
conflict with WWF's, are slightly different. Because of ReefDoctor's relatively long presence 111 
Ranobe Bay it is perhaps more aware of the local conditions than WWF. From ReetDoctor's 
perspective, MPAs are not the answer to creating effective coastal management and development in 
Ranobe Bay. Instead, ReefDoctor sees the Ranobe Project as an opportunity to recruit support for its 
previously existing programs (environmental education, marine surveys, a women's association), both 
financially and in terms of the institutional experience and resources that a large organization like 
WWF can bring to any project. ReetDoctor is well aware that on its own it lacks the capacity to 
effectively promote integrated coastal management in the entire Ranobe Bay area. FIMIHARA in 
particular needs more support than ReefDoctor can provide if it is to truly become an organization 
capable of managing the entire Bay (the long term vision on which that organization was founded). 
ReefDoctor is also aware of the benefits that could flow from being affiliated with such a well-known 
organization as WWF in terms of strengthening its own organizational legitimacy and that of its 
projects. 
On the other hand ReefDoctor also feels that the Ranobe Project, if not managed correctly, has 
the potential to upset a lot of the progress that ReefDoctor has made in the Bay in terms of building 
trust with the local communities and in terms of ensuring that FlMIHARA grows in capacity and 
embraces responsibilities at a pace that is commensurate with it's own initiative and abilities rather than 
that of outside organizations. By collaborating with WWF, ReefDoctor is hopeful that it can mitigate 
against these potential challenges. 
FIMIHARA's expectations of the Ranobe Project have not been articulated, as the association is 
still completely unaware of the project's existence. However during interviews with several key 
members of that association, including its president, it is clear that their greatest desire from any 
foreign aid project is not for a system of MPAs. Even the establishment of the Rose Garden, a small 
MPA of only 16,000 square meters, was not established without concerns being expressed by many 
fishers who claimed that it was "too big". One local village leader said that with enough education 
and incentives, favorable community sentiment might make another MPA possible in six or seven 
years, but not before then. Even now, it is believed by many in the Vezo community that the Rose 
Garden is still fished on a fairly regular basis, albeit secretly. There is generally widespread 
skepticism amongst the community that similar coastal management efforts will lead to a healthier bay 
in terms of fish diversity and numbers. 
On the other hand, what the members of FIMIHARA and the Vezo community in general desire 










better exploit the fishing grounds just outside of the reef wall that encloses Ranobe Bay is wanted. 
According to the findings of the survey, the community is of the opinion that the productivity of fish 
within the Bay has been declining for the past several decades. However, their solution to this 
problem is not to declare an MPA system, but rather to begin focusing their fishing efforts outside the 
bay. There are two reasons given for this approach. First, they believe that the fish will be more 
abundant there, and second, they believe that by concentrating their fishing efforts outside of the Bay 
they will be giving the interior of the Bay, a chance to recover naturally. 
As with FIMIHARA, the specific objectives that the local government institutions, including 
the IHSM, would have for the Ranobe Project are not known as they are unaware of the project's 
existence. However, based on interviews with members of this group, two important general points 
can be made here concerning how these institutions envision the objectives of any coastal management 
project. First, coastal management, as conceived by local governance institutions including the 
IHSM, is a matter of science and law enforcement. The goals of any proper coastal management 
project should be determined through scientific data collection on the ecological conditions of the 
manne area and these should be supported by regulations that are aimed at maintaining a certain 
scientifically derived acceptable level of fish diversity and abundance. Effective coastal management 
then is simply a matter of acquiring good scientific data and ensuring that enforcement of the 
regulations based upon that data is carried out consistently. Both of these objectives in turn require 
sufficient capacity, both technical and financial, from implementing agencies. It is here, in the 
developing world, that local governments generally turn to foreign agencies to provide such financial 
and technical capacity. This approach to coastal management is very reminiscent of the technically 
rational methods first practiced in much of the developed world in the 1950s and 60s. Efforts to 
engage local communities, implement education campaigns and co-management arrangements, or even 
community run MPAs, are at best seen as only a small part of coastal management and at worst as 
illegitimate replacements for it. Interviews with leaders of the IHSM and the Department of Rural 
Development expressed little confidence in community based management efforts and instead seemed 
to be focused on devising methods to attract the type of large-scale funding that they believed 
necessary in order to implement a 'real' coastal management program in the area. 
The above findings show that interorganizational coordination in the Ranobe Project occurred, 
but on a very limited scale. Limited communication and participation, for both technical and 
ideological reasons, frustrated the relevant organization's ability to coordinate their activities. A 
widespread lack of capacity, both financial and educational, made coordination difficult. Poor levels 











the goals of the Ranobe Project constrained the range of potential coordinated action. 
5.1.5 Net'fl'orks oUndividuals, Not Organizations 
Finally, this research found that the interorganizational coordination network in the Ranobe 
Project was actually much more about personal relationships than organizational ones. The interviews 
particularly made clear that coordination in the Ranobe Project was not necessarily occurring because 
the organizations involved in the Ranobe Project were ideologically dedicated to ICM's principal of 
interorganizational coordination (this is not to say that they were not), but because certain individuals 
within those organizations had formed personal and professional relationships. For example, the 
Director of ReefDoctor was introduced to the proposal writer at WWF through the Director of Blue 
Ventures. In turn, the proposal writer knew of the possibility offunding from WWF Sweden through 
a personal contact at that office. More generally, personal relationships between ReefDoctor staff and 
hotelier/dive shop owners dictated who was, and who was not, involved in ReefDoctor's coastal 
management plans and projects. In the Ranobe Project trust at an interorganizational level did not 
seem to exist, or at least seemed only to be fostered once trust at an interpersonal level, between 
individuals within those organizations, had been established. Hence, WWF Tulear as an organization 
trusted ReefDoctor as an organization, partly because its proposal writer had established a relationship 
with ReefDoctor's Director. WWF Antannarivo, on the other hand, whose staff had no such 
relationships with ReefDoctor staff, seemed not to trust ReefDoctor as an organization. 
Furthermore, individuals in the Ranobe Project were not only critical to forming 
interorganizational trust, they were also critical to project implementation. In the case of FIMIHARA, 
the personal networks of certain socially high status individuals, namely the mayors of the villages 
surrounding Ranobe Bay, despite their having rather low hieratically assigned intraorganizational status 
within FIMIHARA, in practice determined the character of FIMIHARA's interorganizational 
coordination. In terms of involving FIMIHARA in the Ranobe Project's implementation it was to these 
high status individuals that ReefDoctor was planning to communicate with most frequently in order to 
mobilize local interest and action. This finding may be somewhat anecdotally intuitive to those with 
some coastal management experience, but it has not been much discussed in either the ICM literature 
or even in the lOR literature. In the Ranobe Project, individuals and their personal and professional 
networks clearly influenced the character of its interorganizational coordination network, so much so 











interpersonal rather than interorganizational. 
6. Discussion 
This dissertation began by showing that ICM theory, and consequently its programs, have to 
date had a very poor understanding of interorganizational relations. Although its theorists have 
advocated for improved IORs, their programs and polices do not reflect a sophisticated understanding 
of how IORs are formed, function, and why they might fail. Consequently, ICM program 
implementers, as the above findings show, although intellectually convinced of the benefits that could 
arise from interorganizational coordination, are at an almost completely loss of how to achieve such 
coordination. The goal of this research has therefore been to give ICM theorists a better 
understanding of IORs by drawing insights and lessons from the case study, Ranobe Project, 
investigated in southwestern Madagascar. Below we will apply the lOR literature to the above 
findings and outline some insights that the lOR literature has for turning the ICM ideal of 
interorganizational collaboration into a reality. This research found that no lOR theorist had looked 
specifically at coastal management issues, nor had any ICM theorist specifically looked at lOR theory. 
However, the lOR literature proved very powerful in its ability to predict and explain the events that 
occurred in this case study. The insights provided below from the lOR literature have wide 
application for ICM theory and practice. 
The following discussion will proceed in roughly the same order that the lOR literature was 
previously reviewed in chapter 3. First, definitional issues concerning coordination will be discussed. 
The lOR literature has some important insights concerning the productivity that ICM can reasonably 
expect from interorganizational coordination networks in a developing world context. Next, issues of 
context, both policy and structural, and the insights that the lOR literature has regarding how 
institutions and their policies can better foster ICM appropriate IORs will be discussed. Finally, the 
discussion looks at issues surrounding culture and management style, and examines what the lOR 
literature says can be done to ease coordination between diverse organizations. 
6.1 Coordination; what is it? 











believe that interorganizational coordination, in principle, is important to successful coastal 
management then we must be able to define it before we can implement it. Honadle and Cooper 
(1998) provide a clear definition that has guided this research. Interorganizational coordination is 
communication, resource sharing, and joint action, between organizations that for largely ideological, 
rather than hierarchal reasons, are convinced that their coordinated action is needed to achieve a stated 
objective (Honadle & Cooper, 1989). Unfortunately, the organization's involved in the Ranobe 
project, as the above findings show, do not share a common understanding of what coordination means 
and why it is important. 
Malagasy government officials and the IHSM tend to view coordination, and this has been 
noted elsewhere in the country (Brinkerhoff 1993), not as a process of collaboration between equal, or 
at least non-hierarchically related organizations, but as a process through which power can be 
regulated. Therefore, their pursuit of coordination is not solely guided by a conviction that it is 
necessarily programmatically required, as ICM theory contends, but because it is a way to control the 
actions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both foreign and local, usually to ensure that they 
are not excluded from such actions. 
Even amongst the NGOs involved In the Ranobe Project, the research found that each 
organization had a different understanding of what coordination means. One of ReetDoctor's primary 
concerns in this regard is ensuring that its relationship with WWF is conducted in such a manner that 
ReetDoctor is considered a partner in the project's implementation and not a mere consultant to WWF. 
The interview with ReetDoctor's Director highlighted recent experiences where a small NGO in 
Madagascar had been sidelined by a larger NGO that unfairly (from the point of view of the smaller 
organization) took the lion's share of the credit for a marine conservation project. This experience has 
made ReetDoctor as an organization sensitive to its own position vis-a.-vis WWF in the Ranobe Project. 
Nor is this a trivial consideration. For in the development arena, building organizational legitimacy, 
and hence securing future funding, depends heavily on an organization's project implementation 
history. 
This research showed that WWF's understanding of its relationship with ReetDoctor, on the 
other hand, is quite complex. On the one hand the proposal's author at WWF Tulear sees ReetDoctor 
as a full partner in, and indeed the lead implementor of, the Ranobe Project. At this level, both 
organizations's understanding of what coordination entails is roughly similar, and accordingly, both 
sides describe their relationship fairly positively. However, it is important to note that WWF Tulear 
has a very limited ability to independently enter into Honadle and Cooper's (1989) highest level of 











funding. On the other hand, WWF's head office in Antananarivo (WWF Tana), which does have such 
authority, seems to be defining coordination with ReefDoctor along different lines. Instead of viewing 
the relationship between ReefDoctor and itself as a collaboration between equal parties, WWF Tana, by 
its repeated insistence that ReefDoctor revise its project proposal to meet its requirements, seems to 
view ReefDoctor more as a consultant to be hired than as a partner to work along side. This has been 
a major source of frustration to ReefDoctor. As Honadle and Cooper (1989) predicted, lower levels 
of coordination, such as are occurring between WWF Tulear and ReefDoctor are much easier to 
achieve than the higher levels of coordination that WWF Tana and ReefDoctor are attempting to 
engage 111. Unfortunately WWF Tulear, who trust ReefDoctor, has no power to authorize joint action, 
while WWF Tana, who do not seem to trust ReefDoctor, hold all the power. The result has been a 
much delayed implementation process. 
The lOR literature has a few insights to offer concerning these issues. First, generically the 
lOR literature makes clear that all organization's within an interorganizational network need to share a 
common understanding of how they are to relate to each other and why it is important to do so (Fong 
et. al. 2007). In terms of interorganizational coordination in ICM programs it is necessary that all 
involved organizations share a common definition of coordination. The expectations that arise from 
this common definition should also be explicitly defined, jointly agreed upon, and verifiable. In a 
developing world context, it is important that these expectations take into account the potential 
technical, linguistic, cultural and other barriers that may constrain the amount of feasible coordination. 
Unrealistic expectations lead to failures that in turn erode interorganizational trust. 
Second, the lOR literature makes clear that coordination of any kind is a laborious, and time 
and resource consuming process (Honadle & Cooper 1989). This is doubly true of ICM-style 
coordination because of ICM's insistence that a large number of parties be included in its coastal 
management projects and because it insists that those parties should not be forced into some 
hierarchically arranged structure. Furthermore, especially in the developing world it must be 
recognized that many of the normatively involved parties in ICM programs lack the capacity to engage 
in such coordinating processes and so must be empowered to do so by the more capacitated members. 
This means that ICM projects must budget for coordination and not simply expect it to happen even if 
all parties are ideologically committed to it. Transportation costs, material costs for cell phones, 
computers, and other equipment, translators, and the educational resources needed by those without the 
capacity to exploit such technologies, all need to be explicitly budgeted for in any ICM program 
proposal or plan. 











effectively when it is tangibly clear to all involved organizations that it is indispensable to achieving 
their project goals. In the private sector, profit realization provides this proof. However, in the 
development arena where market forces are absent, the incentives for coordinated action are almost 
entirely ideologically based. This has proven insufficient. The lOR literature makes it clear that it is 
a "myth that exhortations for more coordination will overcome organizational inertia and resource 
scarcity" (Honadle & Cooper 1993). The lOR literature does not quibble with ICM's call for greater 
coordination or ICM's insistence that such coordination will eventually lead to more effective coastal 
management. However, it does say that the benefits of coordinated action must be immediately 
apparent to the involved organizations. Unfortunately, most indicators of effective coastal 
management are rarely so immediate. Therefore greater coordination in ICM may need to be 
promoted by structuring donor funding for ICM projects in such a way that it makes verifiable 
coordinated action, or detailed plans for it, a pre-requisite to receiving donor funding. As previously 
stated, this would make it all the more important that the expectations concerning coordination in any 
lCM project be explicit and jointly agreed upon during the formulation phase of any project. 
6.2 Context Matters 
Having discussed the importance of a common understanding of coordination, the lOR 
literature also makes clear that the character of interorganizational coordination in any project will 
depend largely upon the structural contexts within which it is operating. Because ICM theory is 
specific about the type of IORs that are needed for successful project implementation, ensuring that the 
'right' contexts exist is of critical importance. In Warren's (1967) typology, as outlined in the literature 
review, these contexts were identified as "federated" or "coalitional". In both contexts the IORs occur 
within networks that have no dominant authority capable of coercing any other member in the network. 
Coordination is voluntarily pursued, based upon each member organization's recognition that they have 
mutual dependencies, common ideals, and common goals. This makes for a 'flat' rather than 
'pyramidal' interorganizational coordination network. 
Unfortunately, the organizations involved in the Ranobe Project struggled to form such a "flat" 
network through which to implement their coastal management plans. One reason for this may be that 
none of the Ranobe Project organizations internally have such flat intraorganizational coordination 












The Malagasy government, following the administrative style of its former French colonizers, 
has a very hierarchically arranged management structure (Brinkerhoff 1993). Regional offices for 
rural development, such as the one in Tulear, often lack the authority to authorize joint action with 
NGOs and in any case rarely have the finances to implement such action. Large-scale funding from 
the UNDP and GEF for the third phase of the NEAP, is tightly and centrally controlled by head offices 
in Antananarivo. The IHSM, a nominally government-funded organization, in practice relies heavily 
upon its own ability to attract foreign funding precisely because it is aware that government funding is 
unreliable, meager, and entirely centrally controlled in Antananarivo. 
Nor are the local communities in Ranobe Bay any more familiar with 'flat' coordination 
networks. Yezo culture is traditional and hierarchically arranged (Astuti, 1995). Family affiliation, 
wealth, and history, determine one's status and power in a community and although village 
governments are popularly elected, the idea that one's authority to govern comes from, and is curtailed 
by, the will of the people is still very tenuously understood or accepted by local leaders. Therefore 
this research found that rIMIHARA's leadership, which is dominated by local village leaders, is 
uninterested in expanding its membership base because it already believes that it knows the will of the 
people and doesn't necessarily feel that expanding FIMIHARA's membership will increase their 
legitimacy or authority to manage the Ranobe Bay area. 
Nor is the relationship between the Yezo people and the foreign residents in Ranobe Bay based 
upon modern egalitarian principles. Colonial history, huge wealth disparities, and cultural differences 
complicate this relationship. These discrepancies have in general created an environment in which 
both sides are skeptical of the ability of the other to be capable of engaging in cross-cultural 
relationships of mutual respect and trust. This skepticism can be very severe as exhibited by some of 
the hotelier's in Ranobe or mild as exhibited by the fact that ReefDoctor continues to employ foreign 
staff in most of its top level positions despite having employed for several years Malagasy staff who all 
possess postgraduate degrees from local institutions in marine sciences and have vast experience 
working with the Malagasy people. The point of these statements is not to cast critical judgments on 
any of the above organizations or groups but rather to simply point out that each of them does not view 
the other as a partner with whom they can engage in an egalitarian relationship. Yet, it is precisely 
these ideals that underpin ICM theory'S call for 'flatter' coordination networks and management 
structures. 
Finally, this research found that inter and intraorganizational relations amongst and within 
NGOs are often far from 'flat'. The centralization of WWF in Madagascar has just been discussed. 











simply because the vast majority of funding is held by a very small number of development agencies 
such as the UN development agencies, World Bank and IMF. Because most smaller NGOs in turn 
rely on these larger agencies for funding their priorities tend to mirror those of their patrons. This 
certainly creates a de facto, if not a de jure, hierarchy amongst development organizations. The 
Ranobe Project is certainly a product of this hierarchy in action. WWF Madagascar has recognized 
the need for greater marine conservation in Madagascar for several years but until recently has not 
pursued such projects because the larger agencies were not funding such projects However, it is 
interesting to note that ReefDoctor is not a typical small NGO because it is almost entirely funded by a 
private trust managed by its founder and his family. Because of this, it has escaped the usual de facto 
hierarchy of the development arena. Its priorities need not be, and in practice are not, as directly 
influenced by those of the larger agencies precisely because it does not rely on them for project 
funding. The Ranobe Project is ReefDoctor's first large scale collaborative effort with a large NGO 
and its insistence on being considered an equal partner is all the more understandable if one recognizes 
its past independence from the usual developmental hierarchy. 
The above contextual realities that surround the Ranobe Project have certainly in practice 
severely inhibited the quality and quantity of its IORs. It is difficult to expect leM-style 
interorganizational coordination to arise from such contexts and indeed the Ranobe Project has 
struggled in this regard. The lOR literature has a few insights to offer. First because lOR literature 
states that context is so important, it follows that successful leM projects will not occur in places with 
such ill-suited contextual circumstances as those that exist in the Ranobe Project. The lack of 
egalitarian cultural norms, a relatively low level of technological ability in the local population, broad 
based resource scarcity and the low levels of trust found in the Ranobe Project are all contextual 
circumstances that inhibit the creation of an effective interorganizational coordination network. This 
does not necessarily mean that reM programs should be restricted to only areas that are already 
contextually suitable. Rather it simply requires leM programs to more consciously recognize that if 
the contextual conditions are not in place then the program must spend a considerable amount of effort 
on addressing these constraints. As already discussed, some leM proponents such as Jentofi (2005) 
have recognized that reM not only requires contexts in which egalitarian principles have been 
internalized, but can, and should, also be an instrument to promoting such ideals. However, in order 
to do this effectively, leM projects must be aware, accept, and explicitly plan for being part of that 
larger enterprise of inculcating egalitarian principles into the societies in which they seek to operate. 
The member organizations in the Ranobe Project, although aware of the ill-suited contexts, have made 











Furthermore, part of engaging in this larger enterprise means that the organizations promoting 
such flat management structures should themselves be operating according to such principles. Not 
only does this set a good example, but more practically, it gives [CM promoting organizations 
institutional experience on how to effectively operate in such 'flat' organizational environments. Only 
with this experience in hand can they go on to teach others. The Ranobe Project certainly 
demonstrates that organizations that do not "practice what they preach" will not be effective at 
implementing their gospel as it were. 
6.3 Policy Matters 
Once partner organizations have a mutual understanding of coordination, and are operating in a 
federated or coalitional context, [OR literature says that they then need to focus on the policies or plans 
that will guide implementation of their objectives. As discussed in Chapter 2, ICM theory is rather 
specific about the kinds of policies that lead to effective coastal management. The Ranobe Project's 
proposal, which is serving as its policy document, broadly reflects an understanding of ICM's 
prescriptions. However, it was not formulated in a participatory manner and the early stages of its 
implementation have not involved all the local actors that ICM theory states is preferable. 
lOR literature can assist with understanding this situation and offer some insights. First, 
returning to Matland's (1995) policy contexts, the policies and goals of the Ranobe Project are 
problematic if one is intent on conducting coastal management according to ICM theory, for those 
policies and goals are both highly conflictual and vague. As previously discussed, many of the Vezo 
are hostile to the idea of creating more MPAs, some local hotelier's are hostile to the creation of any 
community-based management structure, the Malagasy government is skeptical of the effectiveness of 
such structures, and even the NGOs implementing the project have different understandings of the 
project's objectives. Although there is international, and even national agreement amongst the 
Malagasy government that MPAs are vital to the conservation of marine resources, as required by the 
NEAP, Durban Vision, and MAP goals, implementing such schemes are highly controversial at the 
local level. The lOR literature states that there are only two ways of dealing with such controversy. 
The first is by resorting to power, which ICM theory rejects, and the second is by changing the policy 
through consensus building, which rCM endorses. Unfortunately, the Ranobe Project seems to have no 
future plans to devise a formal project policy document. This precludes any possibility for further 











been more participatory it is likely that its objectives would have been more broadly acceptable to all 
the parties involved. 
However, in a developing world context, it is also quite probable that those objectives would not 
have been able to garner the international funding that this proposal did. This seems to be poorly 
recognized by the ICM literature. Donor agencies are unlikely to fund fishing equipment for the Vezo 
especially if it may result in further overfishing, or cater for the desires of foreign hotelier's for "proper" 
command and control style western coastal management. ICM proponents have not sufticiently 
resolved this tension between the immediate goals of ICM, that of sustainable ecological coastal 
management, and its insistence that local concerns and local involvement are both normatively and 
practically essential to any coastal management effort. The assumption that by adopting participatory 
governance approaches that involve capacity building, interested and affected parties will be more 
inclined or more able to sustainably use coastal resources may be naive, or at least ineffectual, in a 
developing world context. Although it is important to remain mindful of the potential utility of local 
ecological knowledge and customary rules, it is narve to believe that those rules and knowledge are 
sufticient for effective coastal management today. Yet, the findings of this study suggest that in the 
Ranobe Project most of the involved parties are not inclined to participate in such 'education' or 
'capacity building' exercises. The research found that many of the Vezo are skeptical of any coastal 
management efforts, especially of projects or programs that involve 'outside' entities. Information 
about the finite nature of Ranobe Bay's resources and the need for sound "management" in the bay is 
regarded with skepticism. On the other side, the vast majority of the hoteliers, although invited to 
participate, have taken no interest in being part of FIMIHARA. Although they are aware of the 
ecological problems in Ranobe Bay they are equally skeptical of the ability of a community-based 
management effort to successfully resolve those problems. Furthermore, such educational processes, 
even when welcomed, are practically difficult to implement and immensely time consuming. As 
stated earlier, even the rare villager sympathetic to MPAs stated that it would take at least another six or 
seven years before the local Vezo population would accept the establishment of a second MPA in 
Ranobe Bay. This would not be a problem but for the fact that the Bay, from an ecological 
perspective, may not survive that long. ReetDoctor's science staff, the IHSM research staff, and a 
recent preliminary impact assessment undertaken in the Bay (Toliara 2006), all agree that the 
possibility of a total ecosystem collapse in Ranobe Bay is a real danger. Furthermore, international 
donors are rarely interested in funding projects that take six years or more to establish one small MPA. 
The second problem with the Ranobe Project's policy document in terms of interorganziational 











again the Ranobe Project's only policy document) are limited. The proposal is less than 10 pages in 
length. Matland (1995) states that policy ambiguity stifles interorganziational coordination because it 
allows the involved parties to form different understandings of the project goals and gives no guidance 
as to how such organizations are to define their individual roles. The Ranobe Project's policies are 
ambiguous, even WWF and ReetDoctor, the only two organizations privy to the proposal have different 
understandings of the project's objectives and their respective roles. For the other organizations 
normatively involved in the Ranobe Project, its objectives are either completely unknown, or only 
vaguely understood. In experimental contexts, lOR theory states that such policy ambiguity may be 
unavoidable and actually useful. Many involved in the Ranobe Project would agree with this sentiment. 
For as just stated, it is doubtful that the Ranobe Project would have received any funding at all, had the 
policy document more clearly reflected the objectives of all relevant parties. Too much clarity may 
expose conflict that hinders project implementation. Moreover, ICM theory itself endorses a certain 
amount of policy ambiguity in so far as it may assist in increasing project adaptability. Called 
'adaptive management' this thinking in the ICM literature states that experimentation and flexible goal 
setting is important to effective coastal management. In terms of the Ranobe Project, this lack of 
clarity provides a justification for the lack of a detai led pol icy document. 
However, Matland (1995) also states that goal achievement in experimental contexts may not be 
a realistic expectation. This is certainly a problem for the Ranobe Project and ICM theory generally, 
because ICM proponents claim that ICM is not simply a process of institutional learning, but a system 
that can achieve the goal of ensuring sustainable coastal resource use. Here again, lOR theory seems 
to be challenging some of the basic tenants of ICM theory. The experimental policy contexts that 
ICM seems to promote, are not capable of producing the results that ICM theory needs to justify its 
claim to being an effective means of sustainable coastal management. The lOR literature states that 
interorganizational coordination capable of effective goal achievement requires clarity and low-conflict 
and yet ICM theory, and the contexts within which it is working, especially in the developing world, as 
evidenced by the particulars of the Ranobe Bay Project, promote neither of these characteristics 
sufficiently. This may require ICM theorists to do a major rethinking of their priorities. 
6.4 Brinkerhoff's Threats 
In the literature review, following an examination of contexts this study discussed a series of 











these challenges into threats arising from autonomy maintenance, lack of task consensus, and 
vertical!horizontal conflicts. The Ranobe Project suffered from all of these threats. The lack of task 
consensus amongst ReefDoctor, WWF, FIMIHARA, the Malagasy government, as well as the foreign 
businesses in Ranobe Bay, has already been discussed. In terms of autonomy, ReetDoctor, WWF, and 
the hotelier's, all have clear temptations to act autonomously rather than cooperatively. Both WWF 
and ReetDoctor, although at vastly different scales, are financially self-supporting. Therefore "going it 
alone," as one interviewee stated, is always a temptation even in the face of ICM's prescriptions and 
their own experience that such efforts usually fail. For hoteliers as well, cooperative action is usually 
too frustrating and seldom yields positive results. Many would rather simply rely on their financial and 
historical dominance in Ranobe Bay to secure favorable operating conditions. Finally, in terms of 
vertical! horizontal conflicts, the conflict between international and even national demands for timely 
and publishable achievements often conflicts with the ability of local institutions to implement projects 
with meaningful local impact and long-term sustainability. The Ranobe Project is clearly a victim of 
this in so far as the international and national call to increase the number of MPAs in the country, is 
conflicting with the ability of ReefDoctor to institute a grassroots development amongst the Vezo 
population that is sympathetic to such marine conservation initiatives. 
To help alleviate these threats, Brinkhoff (1996) and the lOR literature in general have several 
recommendations. First, as already mentioned, they focus on the importance of organizations 
knowing explicitly "the rules of the game"(Brinkerhotf 1996) by which they are to operate with each 
other. This does not necessarily imply the existence of a dominant rule creator and enforcer as exists 
in a hierarchy. Rules can be cooperatively formulated, but they must be explicit and followed. This 
has not yet happened in the Ranobe Project. The formulation of a formal policy document in a 
participatory manner would be an opportunity for such cooperative rule making. 
Second, lOR theory states that interorganizational coordination requires that organizations see 
the benefits of committing to such action. This requires context-producing agencies, such as 
governments and larger NGOs, to create operating environments that reward organizations for 
interorganizational coordination and penalizes its absence. To date, the Malagasy government, 
although it attempted to create such an atmosphere through its EMC in phase two of the NEAP, has 
accomplished very little in this regard. Nor does it seem that WWF Sweden, the largest funding 
agency in terms of the Ranobe Project, has any system in place to monitor the level of 
interorganizational coordination occurring in the Ranobe Project. 
Third, lOR literature states that demanding too high a level of interorganizational coordination 











activities with every other organization are not always necessary or desirable. lnterorganizational 
coordination is important but if pursued too zealously, tends slow down implementation and cause 
unnecessary interorganizational friction that in turn causes organizations to seek greater autonomy. In 
terms of the Ranobe Project, this dynamic has not occurred because of the limited amount of 
interorganizational coordination and mandated dependency. However, in this regard it is interesting to 
note that WWF is consciously working through ReefDoctor in Ranobe Bay rather than making its own 
efforts to establish a relationship with the local Yezo. The practical wisdom of this decision is still 
unclear, but it does potentially follow [OR theory's prescriptions by streamlining the Ranobe Project's 
interorganizational network. 
Fourth, lOR literature states that rather than producing long-term policy VISIOns, 
interorganizational coordination is better fostered when plans are short and detailed (Brinkerhoff 1996). 
Such plans not only provide sufficient guidance for the involved organizations but they also allow for 
long-term project adaptability and give opportunities for frequent interorganizational consultation. In 
practice, the Ranobe Project is actually doing this in so far as ReetDoctor's funding proposal to WWF 
is for two very specific projects that are situated in the rather vague, and therefore potentially very 
adaptable, proposal document. 
Finally, lOR literature states that building effective interorganizational coordination networks 
should take time. Organizations must become familiar with each other in order to develop the crucial 
trust needed for interorganizational coordination. Attempting to rush this trust-building process or 
relying on interorganizational coordination early in a project's implementation, is a "ticket to frustration 
and failure" (Brinkerhoff, 1996). In many ways, the Ranobe Project is taking this advice. 
lnterorganizational coordination thus far is limited, and to expect it to be anything more so early in the 
project's implementation cycle is not only unrealistic but, according to the lOR literature, dangerous in 
so far as it can create expectations that will inevitably not be met which in turn will create 
interorganizational frustration that further jeopardizes project implementation. lOR literature stresses 
that in experimental contexts, a project's organizational capacity building may be the only realistic 
objective for any project and certainly states that project goals will only be achieved once this 
educational process is complete. It should be expected then, that the Ranobe Project will not achieve 
its project objectives until sufficient levels of interorganizational trust and intraorganizational capacity 
are achieved. The organizations in the Ranobe Project are presently under-capacitated and lack 
interorganizational trust. For now, the lOR literature states that these organizations should 
concentrate on addressing these two issues. Whether or not leM can afford to take the time to do this 













The tinal issue discussed in the literature revIew was concerned with the barriers to 
inter~)fganizational coordination that exist because of differing administrative styles amongst member 
organizations. These differing styles arise largely from the differing cultures from which each 
organization comes. The organizations in the Ranobe Project certainly exhibited a variety of different 
administrative styles. The centralization of WWF Madagascar and the Malagasy government as 
well as the traditional administrative culture of FIMIHARA have already been discussed. However, 
administrative differences between member organizations in any interorganizational network can go 
much deeper than differences on how they distribute power. Culture, the foundation stone upon 
which administrative systems are built, can influence a variety of factors that shape the character of 
administrative systems. Culture can determine with whom people associate, and more importantly 
with whom they will not associate. Culture can determine norms of etiquette, attitudes toward time, 
and a host of other factors. In terms of interorganizational coordination, recognizing that these 
differences exist is important because they affect greatly the amount of trust that can reasonably be 
expected to exist between the various organizations involved in a project. In the Ranobe Project, 
differences in administrative style, which were closely correlated to cultural background, certainly 
limited the amount of interorganizational trust and hence coordination amongst the member 
organizations. The WWF Tana office is dominantly comprised of ethnic Merina, as is most of the 
Malagasy government bureaucracy. The proposal writer at WWF Tulear is a western expatriate. 
Western expatriates also dominate ReeIDoctor's senior staff, while FIMIHARA is comprised primarily 
of the local Vezo ethnic group. Finally, hotelier's and dive shop owners are primarily French 
expatriates. Interaction between these cultural groups, though existent, is usually limited to an "as 
needed" basis. Moreover, each cultural group is usually reluctant to engage too heavily in the 
dealings of another, for each understands that the other has "their own way of doing things" and 
"meddling" is usually both unappreciated and ineffective. Such attitudes in practice limit cross-
cultural administrative learning. This certainly was the case in the Ranobe Project. Most expatriate 
ReeIDoctor staff readily admit that it is usually more effective for their indigenous staff to engage with 
the Vezo precisely because they understand Vezo administration and culture so much better. A Vezo 
village leader also stated that Malagasy government officials in practice gave preferential treatment to 











The lOR literature has some advice to offer in this regard. First, it states that when an 
interorganziational network is populated by organizations with diverse administrative styles and 
cultures it is crucial to ensure that the methods by which interorganizational communication is being 
conducted are universally understood. Sometimes called "boundary objects" in the literature, these 
methods of interorganizational communication, be they emails, telephones, documents, or simply 
conservations, must be accessible, usable, and mutually understandable by all the parties normatively 
involved in any given project (Fong et al 2007). In terms of leM, this means that culturally defined 
jargon such as 'sustainability' or 'integration' or even 'coordination' may be inappropriate in 
interorganizational communication or at the very least may need to be collaboratively defined by all 
member organizations at the outset of any reM project. Furthermore, organizations that lack the 
capacity to communicate using these various methods either need to be capacitated to do so, or all 
communication should be translated into forms that are intelligible and accessible to all organizations. 
To date, this has not happened in the Ranobe Project. At a most basic level its "boundary objects" are 
not universal in that the WWF proposal is written only in English, while Malagasy law is written 
primarily in French, and most Vezo speak only Malagasy. 
7. Conclusion 
This study began with the hope that the lOR literature could give leM theorists a more 
sophisticated understanding of why interorganizational coordination has proven so difficult to achieve 
in reM projects in the developing world. Our brief history of coastal management showed that 
although regulating human action, largely for economic and political reasons, provided the initial 
impetus for the first coastal management regimes its early implementers largely failed to recognize and 
account for the role of humans in coastal environments. Modern scientific coastal management, 
although more focused on regulating human action for environmental reasons, largely continued to 
ignore the human dimension. With the advent of leM however, coastal managers have started to 
become more interested in human behavior in the coastal environment. Nevertheless the discipline as a 
whole still exhibits a woefully shallow understanding of humans and how they relate to each other. 
One aspect of human behavior in particular that IeM needs to develop a better understanding of is 
Interorganizational Relations. Fortunately, other academics over the past fifty years have not been so 
disinterested in humans and have a wealth of knowledge about lnterorganizational Relations. The 











insights could be applied to leM planning and implementation. The author of this study spent three 
months living and researching with the implementers of the Ranobe Project in order to document and 
analyze the interorganizational relations occurring there. The research from that study trip suggests that 
lOR theory is very powerful in giving conceptual explanations for many of the circumstances that were 
present in the Ranobe Project. Accordingly the insights that lOR literature has for (eM, as related in 
the above discussion should be helpful to leM implementers. Also, the challenges that lOR theory has 
for leM theory should cause its proponents to do some serious, constructive, rethinking. To conclude 
this report a succinct review of those challenges and insights is helpful. 
As discussed in chapter 3, lOR theory states, and the Ranobe Project showed, that the contexts 
(structural, policy, administrative, and "individual") within which 10Rs occur will heavily influence the 
kind of interorganizational coordination possible in any leM project. Yet to date leM theory and 
implementation has not placed enough attention or physical resources into learning how to improve 
these contextual factors. The structural, policy, and individual "contexts" in which any leM project is 
to be initiated must be explicitly understood before project formulation and implementation. If there 
is ever to be a hope that leM style interorganizational coordination on the ground will match what is 
envisioned in the leM literature implementers must start paying more attention to this work. This 
will inevitably mean that leM proponents, usually ecologically focused environmentalists, will have to 
get out of their comfort zones and start promoting the democratic and egalitarian ideals that leM theory 
is based on. Only then will the kinds of interorganizational networks that leM theory says are so 
critical to effective ecological management ever be possible. 
On the other hand, the lOR literature also makes a clear distinction between 10Rs that are 
capable of producing institutional learning and 10Rs that are capable of successfully implementing a 
set of objectives. Therefore the social empowerment and institutional capacity building that leM 
promotes, even if effectively implemented, alone should not, according to lOR theory, be conflated as 
effective coastal management. Such institution building must be seen as only the first step in any 
coastal management plan capable of effectively maintaining the ecological systems in a coastal 
environment. Whether or not the world's already degraded coastal environments can afford to wait 
for such institutions to be built, at least to this author, is a difficult question. 
Next lOR theory states that ambiguity frustrates interorganizational collaboration and so must 
be minimized. In an environment where the normatively involved organizations have highly 
conflictual agendas and attitudes, as is common in the developing world (and probably everywhere), 
the temptation to retreat into ambiguous project goals is a recipe for disaster in terms of 











conflict in the policy formulation stage of the project without providing any mechanism for resolving it 
later on. As the Ranobe Project shows, in implementation, these conflicts will inevitably reappear. 
The converse of ambiguity is clarity and lOR theory states that this is essential to effective 
interorganizational coordination. In a highly conflictual environment, such as that of the Ranobe 
Project, high clarity may mean that project goals will be more modest, but their explicitness and low 
conflict will stand a much better chance of fostering the interorganizational coordination and 
cooperation that ICM is calling for. 
Next, much of the impetus for ICM's development arose from a general western cultural 
dissatisfaction with centralized and hierarchal management structures. Co-management and Adaptive 
management, two important strains in ICM theory, should have the effect of limiting hierarchy in 
coastal management in terms of power centralization and legitimacy creation. Unfortunately lOR 
theory states that a certain amount of hierarchy may be necessary to ensure interorganizational 
coordination capable of producing more than just institutional learning. Because organizations 
naturally have such a strong preference for independent action, relying on ideological conviction and 
benefits that are not immediately quantifiable in financial or other terms, such as the tangible benefits 
of effective ecosystem management, to provide sufficient motivation for interorganizational 
coordination is naive. A certain amount of command and control, from governments and large donor 
agencies, mandating interorganizational coordination through financial and legal mechanisms may be 
necessary. In the Ranobe Project, although all stakeholders expressed a desire for coordinated action, 
in reality little had occurred and there was no overseeing organization capable of mandating or 
monitoring such coordination. 
Finally, lOR theory problematizes ICM's assertion that effective interorganizational 
coordination, especially in the developing world, will lead to sustainable ecological ecosystem 
management. It does this in two ways. First, because contextually conducive environments for ICM 
style interorganizational coordination are rarely present, as the Ranobe Project showed, ICM projects 
must, to restate the above recommendation, engage in a host of activities normally understood to be 
beyond the purvey of coastal manager's concerns. This author at least is unsure if coastal managers 
are either willing or capable of 'picking up this cross' as it were. Second even if ICM proponents are 
willing, again it is unclear whether the coastal environments that they are seeking to manage can wait 
while such contextually conducive environments for ICM-style management are built. Without 
proper management many of the inhabitants of Ranobe Bay are convinced that it will soon reach a 
tipping point of total ecosystem collapse from which there can be no return. Furthermore this study'S 











foreign, to any "outside" efforts that would have the effect of disturbing the existent status-quo 
traditional socio-political system. 
To conclude, this research makes clear the utility of lOR theory to ICM proponents. Ho\vever 
it only begins to explore the extent of that utility. Clearly the insights that lOR theory has for rCM 
proponents needs more study. The bibliography of this report contains many lOR articles which have 
not been thoroughly discussed in this paper purely for a lack space. Their relevancy to ICM still 
needs more investigation. Some of what the lOR theory says may not make ICM proponent's jobs 
any easier but its insights cannot be ignored. This study was not undertaken to challenge ICM's tenants 
or goals, but to help it implement them more effectively. This author is convinced that the above 
insights, if integrated into rCM discourses, can contribute to improving lCM practice to a point where it 
can no longer be labeled "puny" (Olsen et. af. 1998) or having "failed ... to ensure the environmental 
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